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THE
S E C R E T T R E A T I E S
AND
U N D E R S T A N D I N G S
TEXT OF THE AVAILABLE DOCUMENTS
WITH INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS
AND EXPLANATORY NOTES
BY
F. SEYMOUR COCKS
AND A PREFACE BY
CHARLES TREVELYAN, M.P.
LONDON:
UNION OF DEMOCRATIC CONTROL
407 RED LION COURT, E.C.4
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After line 7 read,
“The port of Durazzo may be given to
the independent Mohammedan state of
Albania.”
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| | CONTENTS | PAGE |
| Preface. By Charles Trevelyan, M.P. | 9 |
| The Secret Agreements | 11 |
| I. | Constantinople, the Straits, and Persia
.......(March, 1915) | 15 |
| II. | The Treaty with Italy (April 26, 1915) | 27 |
| III. | The Partition of Asiatic Turkey
.......(Spring, 1916) | 43 |
| IV. | The Agreement with Roumania
.......(August, 1916) | 49 |
| V. | The Russo-Japanese Treaty (July 3,
...........1916) | 59 |
| VI. | The Left Bank of the Rhine, and the
.......German Frontiers, East and West
.......(February, 1917) | 67 |
| Appendix A.—The Negotiations with Italy | 79 |
Appendix B.—The Negotiations with
...........Greece | 81 |
Appendix C.—Diplomatic Documents
...........Relating to Japan | 84 |
| Appendix D.—Chronological Table | 89 |
| Index | 91 |
| Maps (1) Austria-Hungary and the Treaties. |
| Maps (2) Turkey and the Treaties. |
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7
PREFACE
THE old system of secret diplomacy is tottering to its fall. President
Wilson, who before entering the war had denounced secret diplomacy as the
principal cause of the war, has now placed its abolition in the foremost
place in his programme for securing permanent peace. He has pronounced for:
“Open covenants of peace openly arrived at, after which there shall be no
private international understandings of any kind, but diplomacy shall
proceed always frankly and in the public view.”
That announcement has been hailed with approval by the British Labour Party.
At this juncture the Russian Government has published the Secret Treaties
made among the Allied Governments during the earlier part of the war, and
when the Tsar was still on the throne. Revolutionary Russia has repudiated
all share in the policy which dictated them and has denounced them as
inconsistent with no annexations and the self-determination of peoples.
They have become the common property of the world, and have been published
in every country, belligerent and neutral. I am not, however, aware of the
publication of the full text in any British daily paper except the
Manchester Guardian, and I feel certain that the following handbook, which
contains the text of the treaties as accurately translated from the Russian
as possible, will be welcomed by many people.
9
For the interest of these treaties is not purely historical. They represent
engagements undertaken by the Allied Governments in the earlier part of the
war. Some of those engagements, such as the obligation to present
Constantinople to the Tsar, have lapsed now that the nation chiefly
interested has denounced the policy. Again, the plans in regard to Asiatic
Turkey must be considered to be in process of modification after Mr. Lloyd
George’s declaration that it will be for the World Congress to decide the
fate of Syria and Mesopotamia. But from a recent reply of Lord Robert Cecil
the Italian Treaty is still held to be binding by our Government. Thus it
is that these treaties have a close bearing upon the fortunes of a
democratic peace. They make it more difficult for the true standpoint of
Western democracy to be appreciated. Our statesmen have given the world a
steady flow of assurance that we have entered and sustained the war for
unselfish aims, that we coveted no territory, and that we were not fighting
for conquests or annexations. It would be well for our people to critically
examine the following treaties as a commentary on these wise intentions.
CHARLES TREVELYAN.
The SECRET TREATIES
& UNDERSTANDINGS
THE SECRET TREATIES AND UNDERSTANDINGS printed in the following pages are
now, owing to the action of the Russian Revolutionary Government, the
common property of the world. Their main outlines have already appeared in
the British Press, notably in the Manchester Guardian.
In publishing these documents, which, with others, were found in the
archives of the Russian Foreign Office, M. Trotski said:—
“Secret diplomacy is a necessary weapon in the hands of a propertied
minority, which is compelled to deceive the majority in order to make the
latter obey its interests. Imperialism, with its world-wide plans of
annexation, and its rapacious alliances and arrangements, has developed to
the highest extent the system of secret diplomacy. The struggle against
Imperialism, which has ruined and drained of their blood the peoples of
Europe, means at the same time the struggle against capitalist diplomacy,
which has good reason to fear the light of day. The Russian people, as well
as the peoples of Europe and of the whole world, must know the documentary
truth about those plots which were hatched in secret by financiers and
industrialists, together with their Parliamentary and diplomatic agents.
The peoples of Europe have earned the right to know the truth about these
things, owing to their innumerable sacrifioes and the universal economic
ruin.
“To abolish secret diplomacy is the first condition of an honourable,
popular, and really democratic foreign policy. The Soviet Government makes
the introduction of such a policy its
11
object. For this reason, while openly offering to all the belligerent
peoples and their Governments an immediate armistice, we publish
simultaneously those treaties and agreements which have lost all their
obligatory force for the Russian workmen, soldiers, and peasants, who have
taken the Government into their hands....
“Bourgeois politicians and journalists of Germany and Austria-Hungary may
endeavour to profit by the published documents in order to represent in a
favourable light the diplomacy of the Central Empires. But every effort in
this direction would be doomed to failure for two reasons. In the first
place we intend shortly to put before the public secret documents which
will show up clearly the diplomacy of the Central Empires. ln the second
place-and this is the chief point-the methods of secret diplomacy are just
as international as Imperialist rapacity. When the German proletariat by
revolutionary means gets access to the secrets of its Government
chancelleries, it will produce from them documents of just the same nature
as those which we are now publishing. It is to be hoped that this will
happen as soon as possible.
“The Government of workmen and peasants abolishes secret diplomacy, with
its intrigues, figures, and lies. We have nothing to conceal. Our programme
formulates the passionate wishes of millions of workmen, soldiers, and
peasants. We desire a speedy peace, so that the peoples may honourably live
and work together. We desire a speedy deposition of the supremacy of
capital. In revealing before the whole world the work of the governing
classes as it is expressed in the secret documents of diplomacy, we turn to
the workers with that appeal which will always form the basis of our
foreign policy: ‘Proletariats of all countries, unite!’
“L. TROTSKI, People’s Commissioner for Foreign Affairs.”*
From among the many important diplomatic documents published by M. Trotski,
we have selected those which deal with actual treaties and arrangements
made by the Allies since the beginning of the war. These comprise:
* From the text printed in The New Europe, Dec. 20, 1917.
The Agreement relating to Constantinople and Persia.
The London Treaty with Italy.
The Agreement relating to Asiatic Turkey.
The Agreement with Roumania.
The Russo-Japanese Treaty.
The Agreement relating to the left bank of the Rhine, and the
re-arrangement of the Eastern and Western frontiers of Germany
The period over which these documents range dates from March, 1915, to
March, 1917, shortly before the fall of the Tsar.
I.
Constantinople, the Straits, and Persia
(March 12, 1915).
SUMMARY.—Britain consents to the annexation by Russia of the Straits and
Constantinople, in return for a similar benevolent attitude on Russia’s
part towards the political aspirations of Britain in other parts. The
neutral zone in Persia to be included in British sphere of influence. The
districts adjoining Ispahan and Yezd to be included in Russian sphere, in
which Russia is to be granted “full liberty of action.”
For centuries one of the ambitions of the Russian Government has been to
obtain possession of Constantinople and the Straits. And for generations
one of the aims of British foreign policy has been to prevent Russia
securing this important strategic position.
To prevent Russia obtaining Constantinople was one of the reasons why
Britain engaged in the Crimean War. For the same object Lord Beaconsfield
risked war with Russia in I878, and sent the Mediterranean fleet through
the Dardanelles. It was this occasion which gave rise to the popular song
which gave the “Jingoes” their name, a song which had for its refrain the
words:
“We’ve fought the Bear before, we can fight the Bear again,
But the
Russians shall not have Constantinople.”
15
The present war, however, gave to the old Russian Government the
opportunity of fulfilling the ambition cherished by the Tsars from the days
of Peter the Great, and in the Spring of 1915 the British Government gave
its “consent in writing to the annexation by Russia of the Straits and
Constantinople.”
Rumours of the existence of this understanding speedily became current, and
various unavailing attempts were made in the House of Commons to ascertain
from the British Government whether such an agreement had actually been
concluded.
The following is a typical example of the questions which were put to the
Foreign Secretary on the point, and of the answers which were received:—
May 30, 1916.
Mr. Outhwaite asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether his
attention had been called to an interview in England with Professor Paul
Miliukoff, leader of the Constitutional Democrats in the Russian Duma, in
which he stated our supreme aim in this war is to get possession of
Constantinople, which must belong to Russia entirely, and without reserve;
and can he say whether this statement represents the views of the Russian
Government as regards its supreme aim in the war?
Sir Edward Grey: Professor Miliukoff is a distinguished member of the Duma,
but it is not necessary or desirable to make official comments on
unofficial statements.
Mr. Outhwaite: Did Professor Miliukoff correctly interpret the views of the
Russian Government; does it follow under the pact of London that this
country cannot consider terms of peace until Russia has secured
Constantinople?
Sir Edward Grey: The honourable member is asking for a statement which I do
not think it desirable to make.
Eventually, the existence of the agreement was officially made known, not
through any statement of the British Government, but by an utterance of the
then
| 17 | CONSTANTINOPLE AND PERSIA | 17 |
Prime Minister of Russia, M. Trepoff, in the Duma, on December 2, 1916. M.
Trepoff said:
“An agreement which we concluded in 1915 with Great Britain and France, and
to which Italy has adhered, established in the most definite fashion the
right of Russia to the Straits and Constantinople.... I repeat that
absolute agreement on this point is firmly established among the Allies.”
Now, owing to the action of the Russian Revolutionary Government, we are
able to give further details of this agreement.
The following is the text of a confidential telegram (printed in the
Manchester Guardian, December 12, 1917), from the Russian Minister of
Foreign Affairs (M. Sazonoff) to the Russian Ambassador at Paris.
It is dated March 5 (18),1 1915, and runs as follows:
No. 1226.
“On February 23 (March 8) the French Ambassador, on behalf of his
Government, announced to me that France was prepared to take up a most
favourable attitude in the matter of realisation of our desires as set out
in my telegram to you, No. 937, in respect of the Straits and
Constantinople, for which I charged you to tender Delcassé my gratitude.
“In his oonversations with you, Delcassé had previously more than once
given his assurance that we could rely on the sympathy of France, and only
referred to the need of elucidating the question of the attitude of
England, from whom he, feared some objec-
1 There is a difference of thirteen days between the Russian or Julian
calendar and the Gregorian calendar used in the Western world. When two
dates are given the first is that of the Old Style or Russian calendar.
tions, before he could give us a more definite assurance in the above
sense. Now the British Government has given its complete consent in writing
to the annexation by Russia of the Straits and Constantinople within the
limits indicated by us, and only demanded security for its economic
interests and a similar benevolent attitude on our part towards the
political aspirations of England in other parts.
“For me, personally, filled as I am with most complete confidence in
Delcassé, the assurance received from him is quite sufficient, but the
Imperial Government would desire a more definite pronouncement of France’s
assent to the complete satisfaction of our desires, similar to that made by
the British Government.
(Signed) “SAZONOFF.”
THE “LIMITS INDICATED” BY RUSSIA.
The reader will naturally ask two questions here: First, what were “the
limits indicated by Russia”? Second, what were “the political aspirations
of England in other parts” towards which “a benevolent attitude” was
demanded?
The answers to these questions are to be found in a document first
published in the Pravda (the organ of the Bolsheviks), a translation of
which appeared in The New Europe of December 20,1917, and in the Manchester
Guardian of February 22, 1918. This document is apparently a memorandum of
various secret negotiations drawn up for the information of some Minister.
For purposes of reference, we will call it Document B. The
| 19 | CONSTANTINOPLE AND PERSIA | 19 |
New Europe translation of this document runs as follows:—
MEMORANDUM OF THE RUSSIAN FOREIGN OFFICE.
“On February 19 (March 4), 1915, the Minister of Foreign Affairs handed to
the French and British Ambassadors a Memorandum which set forth the desire
to add the following territories to Russia as the result of the present war:
“The town of Constantinople, the western coast of the Bosphorus, the Sea of
Marmora, and the Dardanelles; Southern Thrace, as far as the Enos-Media
line; the coast of Asia Minor between the Bosphorus and the River Sakaria,
and a point on the Gulf of Ismid to be defined later; the islands in the
Sea of Marmora, and the Islands of Imbros and Tenedos. The special rights
of France and England in the above territories were to remain inviolate.1
“Both the French and British Governments express
1 This arrangement would give to Russia the whole of Turkey in Europe, with
the exception of a small piece of territory in the north around Adrianople
and Kirk Kilisse, which was apparently reserved as a bait to induce
Bulgaria to join the Allies.
“We were given to understand that in order to secure Balkan union, there
were certain concessions that Bulgaria would require, especially in Thrace
and Macedonia; and the Allies were ready to do all in their power to secure
these things for Bulgaria, but. . . it was an essential preliminary that
Bulgaria should take the side of the Allies against Turkey.” (Sir Edward
Grey, in the House of Commons, October 13, 1915).
It would also give to Russia the Asiatic shores of the Bosphorus, the
peninsula of Scutari, and about 80 miles of the Black Sea coast of Asia
Minor. Tenedos and Imbros are islands in the Ćgean, Iying off the entrance
of the Dardanelles. The Asiatic shores of the Sea of Marmora and the
Dardanelles do not appear to have been included.
their readiness to agree to our wishes, provided the war is won, and
provided a number of claims made by France and England, both in the Ottoman
Empire, and in other places, are satisfied.
“As far as Turkey is concerned, these claims are as follows:—
“1. Constantinople is to be recognised as a free port for the transit of
goods [coming from Russia, and not going*] to Russia, and a free passage is
to be given through the Straits to merchant ships.
“2. The rights of England and France in Asiatic Turkey to be defined by
special agreement between France and England and Russia 2 are recognised.
“3. The sacred Mahomedan places are to be protected, and Arabia is to be
under an independent Mahomedan sovereign.
“The neutral zone in Persia established by the Anglo-Russian agreement of
1907 3 is to be included in the English sphere of influence.
“While recognising these demands in general as satisfactory, the Russian
Government made several reservations.
* See note on next page.
2 This agreement was subsequently made in the Spring of 1916. (See page 43.)
3 By the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907 Persia was divided into three
spheres, an extensive “Russian sphere” in the north, which included most of
the principal Persian towns, a smaller “British sphere” in the south-east,
and a central “neutral zone.” The Russian and British spheres were only
spheres of commercial interest. Sir Edward Grey stated that they were not
to be regarded as “political partitions.” “These are only British and
Russian spheres in a sense which is in no way derogatory to the
independence and sovereignty of Persia.”-(Sir Edward Grey, House of
Commons, February 14, 1908).
| 21 | CONSTANTINOPLE AND PERSIA | 21 |
“In view of the formulation of our wishes with regard to the sacred
Mahomedan places it must now be made clear whether these localities are to
remain under the sovereignty of Turkey with the Sultan keeping the title of
Caliph, or whether it is proposed to create new independent States. In our
opinion it would be [undesirable*] to separate the Caliphate from Turkey.
In any case freedom of pilgrimage must be guaranteed.
“While agreeing to the inclusion of the neutral zone of Persia within the
sphere of English influence, the Russian Government considers it right to
declare that the districts round the towns of Ispahan and Yezd [formerly
were fortified*] by Russia, and also that part of the neutral zone which
cuts a wedge between the Russian and Afghan frontiers and goes as far as
the Russian frontier at Zulfagar, was included in the Russian sphere of
influence.
“The Russian Government considers it desirable that the question of the
frontiers between Russia and Northern Afghanistan should simultaneously be
solved according to the wishes expressed at the time of the negotiations of
1914.
“After the entrance of Italy into the war, our wishes were communicated to
the Italian Government also, and the latter expressed its agreement,
provided the war ended in the successful realisation of Italian claims
Note: * The words in brackets are probably mistranslated. The following
respective readings are given in the Manchester Guardian: (a) “not
proceeding from or”; (b) “desirable”; (c) “should be secured.” This
conforms to the sense of telegram No. 1,265 quoted on the next page.
in general, and in the East, in particular,4 and in the recognition by us
for Italy within the territories ceded to us of the same rights as those
enjoyed by France and England.”
The next document printed by the Manchester Guardian is the following
confidential telegram from M. Sazonoff to the Russian Ambassador in London,
dated March 7 (20),1915.
No. 1265.
“Referring to the Memorandum of the British Government (? Embassy) here of
March 12, will you please express to Grey the profound gratitude of the
Imperial Government for the complete and final assent of Great Britain to
the solution of the question of the Straits and Constantinople, in
accordance with Russia’s desires. The Imperial Government fully appreciates
the sentiments of the British Government and feels certain that a sincere
recognition of mutual interests will secure for ever the firm friendship
between Russia and Great Britain.
“Having already given its promise respecting the conditions of trade in the
Straits and Constantinople, the Imperial Government sees no objection to
confirming its assent to the establishment (1) of free transit through
Constantinople for all goods not proceeding from or proceeding to Russia,
and (2) free passage through the Straits for merchant vessels.
“In order to facilitate the breaking through of the Dardanelles undertaken
by the Allies, the Imperial Government is prepared to co-operate in inducing
4 These claims are set out in the provisions of the Treaty of London signed
on April 26, 1915, by representatives of the British, French, Russian, and
Italian Governments. (See page 27.)
| 23 | CONSTANTINOPLE AND PERSIA | 23 |
those States whose help is considered useful by Great Britain and France to
join in the undertaking on reasonable terms.5
“The Imperial Government completely shares the view of the British
Government that the holy Moslem places must also in future remain under an
independent Moslem rule. It is desirable to elucidate at once whether it is
contemplated to leave those places under the rule of Turkey, the Sultan
retaining the title of Caliph, or to create new independent States, since
the Imperial Government would only be able to formulate its desires in
accordance with one or other of these assumptions. On its part the Imperial
Government would regard the separation of the Caliphate from Turkey as very
desirable. Of course the freedom of pilgrimage must be completely secured.
“The Imperial Government confirms its assent to the inclusion of the
neutral zone of Persia in the British sphere of influence. At the same
time, however, it regards it as just to stipulate that the districts
adjoining the cities of Ispahan and Yezd,6 forming with them one
inseparable whole, should be secured for Russia in view of the Russian
interests which have arisen there. The neutral zone now forms a wedge
between the Russian and Afghan frontiers, and cames up to the very frontier
line of Russia at Zulfagar. Hence a portion of this wedge will have to be
annexed to the Russian sphere of influence. Of essential importance
5 The date of the first naval attack in force on the Dardanelles was
February 20, 1915. The military expedition commenced to land on April 25,
1915. Any step which may have been taken by Russia to induce other States
“to join in the undertaking” evidently failed.
6 Two important Persian towns.
to the Imperial Government is the question of railway construction in the
neutral zone, which will require further amicable discussion.
“The Imperial Government expects that in future its full liberty of action
will be recognised in the sphere of influence allotted to it, coupled in
particular with the right of preferentially developing in that sphere its
financial and economic policies.7
“Lastly, the Imperial Government considers it desirable simultaneously to
solve also the problems in Northern Afghanistan adjoining Russia in the
sense of the wishes expressed on the subject by the Imperial Ministry in
the course of the negotiations last year.8
(Signed) “SAZONOFF.”
7 On September 4, 1907, Sir Cecil Spring Rice, British Minister at Teheran,
sent a communication to the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs,
explaining the nature of the Anglo-Russian Convention, in which he said:
“The object of the two Powers in making this agreement is not in any way to
attack, but rather to assure for ever, the independence of Persia. Not only
do they not wish to have at hand any excuse for intervention, but their
object in these friendly negotiations was not to allow one another to
intervene on the pretext of safeguarding their interests. The two Powers
hope that in the future Persia will be for ever delivered from the fear of
foreign intervention, and will thus be perfectly free to manage her own
affairs in her own way.”
Eight years later the arrangements recorded in M. Sazonoff’s telegram were
made.
8 According to an answer given by Lord Islington to Viscount Bryce in the
House of Lords on January 9, 1918, this related to “certain proposals for
improving the irrigation of Russian territory adjoining Afghanistan, which
had been made by the Russian Government before the war. These proposals
never came to a head, and could not have been carried into effect without
the Ameer’s
| 25 | CONSTANTINOPLE AND PERSIA | 25 |
THE PRESENT POSITION.
The Russian Revolutionary Government has now renounced all desire on the
part of Russia to annex Constantinople and the Straits. And, as a result of
this action, Mr. Lloyd George has at last stated, on behalf of the British
Government (January 5, 1918) that:
“we do not challenge the maintenance of the Turkish Empire in the homelands
of the Turkish race with its capital at Constantinople-the passage between
the Mediterranean and the Black Sea being internationalised and
neutralised.”
With regard to Persia the present rulers of Russia have repudiated the
Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907, and have announced their intention of
withdrawing all Russian troops from Persia so as to terminate with all
speed the “acts of violence which Tsarism and the bourgeois Governments of
Russia have committed against the Persian people. “
On this, Lord Curzon has said (January 1, 1918) that:
“the great change in the situation produced by recent events in Russia has given to His
Majesty’s Government a welcome opportunity of testifying their sincerity,”
in repudiating any hostile designs on “the territorial integrity or
political independence of the Persian kingdom.” . . . “We have informed the
Persian Government that we regard the agreement as being henceforward in
suspense.”
consent. No pruposal affecting the territorial integrity of Afghanistan has
been made.”
Lord Islington also stated that “an opportunity was subsequently taken in
the course of correspondence with the Ameer of Afghanistan to give him a
formal assurance that no proposal affecting the interests of his country
would be made or agreed to at the Peace Conference.”
II.
The Treaty with Italy
(April 26,1915.)
SUMMARY.—Italy to receive the Trentino, the Southern Tyrol, Trieste, the
county of Corizia and Cradisca, Istria, Northern Dalmatia, numerous islands
off the Dalmatian coast, Valona (in Albania), twelve islands off the coast
of Asia Minor, a prospective share in the partition of Asiatic Turkey, a
prospective addition to her colonial territory in Africa, and a share in
the war indemnity. The remainder of the Austro-Hungarian coast is to be
divided between “Croatia,” Serbia and Montenegro, thus cutting
Austria-Hungary completely from the sea. Certain stretches of the Adriatic
coast are to be neutralised. There is also a suggestion to partition the
greater part of Albania between Serbia, Montenegro and Greece.
To understand the provisions of the treaty with Italy, and their bearing
upon the question of the Adriatic, it is necessary to consult an atlas.
Open it and turn to the Adriatic. This is a narrow sea running up from the
Mediterranean in a north-westerly direction and separating Italy from the
Balkan peninsula and from Austria-Hungary. It is from 100 to 150 miles
broad and about 600 miles long. It is entered by the Straits of Otranto,
which are less than 50 miles wide and the key to these
27
Straits is the Albanian town of Valona, standing on a fine bay, the
entrance to which is guarded by the island of Saseno.
Now look at the two coasts. They present a striking contrast. The Italian
coast is flat and unindented. There are few harbours of any importance,
Italy’s chief ports being on her western and southern shores. But the
Austrian ooast is deeply indented. Magnificent harbours, capable of
accommodating the fleets of the world, run far inland in every direction.
The water is deep, and the coast is protected all the way down by a chain
of long, narrow islands forming an admirable cover for shipping. It is
possible for a vessel to leave Fiume and to sail down the coast to Ragusa
without -save for one stretch of 20 miles-ever coming out into the open
sea. This coast line which, from Trieste in the north to Spizza in the
south, is in the oocupation of Austria-Hungary, is, therefore, well adapted
both for commercial ports and for naval bases. Pola (in Istria) is the
chief naval station and other important towns, besides Trieste, are the
Croatian port of Fiume, the Dalmatian ports of Zara, Sebenico and Spalato,
Ragusa and Cattaro.
THE “SACRED EGOISM” OF ITALY.
Upon this magnificent coast-line-especially upon that of Dalmatia-Italian
expansionists have for many years cast longing eyes. And in the present war
these Italian Imperialists saw an opportunity of realising their cherished
ambitions. The spirit in which they set to work can be judged from
representative utterances of some of them.
On October 18, 1914, Signor Salandra took over the Foreign Office for a
time, and struck the key-note of the
policy he intended to pursue in the following words:—
“What is needed is.... a freedom from all preconceptions and prejudices,
and from every sentiment except that of sacred egoism (sacro egoismo) for
Italy.”
Meanwhile a “raging, tearing propaganda” was started in support of Italian
expansion. The Society Pro Dalmazia was founded to advocate Italy’s claim
to the opposite shores of the Adriatic. The “rights of nationality” were
brushed aside. The Giornale d’ltalia (whose chief proprietors are Baron
Sonnino and Signor Salandra) announced (April 4, 1915) that:
“There are political and military considerations which are above any
question of nationality whatever “
and Italy’s rulers entered into negotiations with the object of securing
the territorial and other concessions they desired.
Italy’s demands on the Allies at that time were summarised by a French
writer, M. Charles Vellay, in his La Question de l’Adriatique in the
following words:—
“Italy categorically-one might say brutally expressed a desire, which was
not embarrassed by any consideration of justice or reason, and she plainly
avowed her aim, viz., the destruction of all rivalry by sea, absolute
ascendancy.” *
This view of Italy’s claims is quite frankly confessed by the Giornale
d’Italia (April 19, 1915):
“The principal objective of Italy in the Adriatic is the solution, once for
all, of the politico-strategic question of a sea which is commanded in the
military sense from the eastern shore, and such a problem can be solved
only by one method- by eliminating from the Adriatic every other war
fleet..... From the military point of view Italy ought not to make a
compromise.... neither a fort, nor a gun, nor a submarine, that is not
Italian, ought to be in the Adriatic.”
* Quoted in A Bulwark against Germany by Bogumil Vosnjak (George Allen and
Unwin).
Eventually the concessions offered by the Allies were considered
satisfactory and Italy decided to come into the war on the side of the
champions of democracy and small nations. The terms of Italy’s entry into
the conflict were settled by a secret convention, now known as the Treaty
of London.
TERMS OF THE TREATY.
The Treaty of London was concluded between Britain, France, Russia and
Italy, and signed on April 26,1915. The terms of the treaty appeared in
Isvestia (the organ of the Soviet) on November 28, 1917, and a translation
was printed in the Manchester Guardian on January 18,1918, and, in a
slightly different form, in The New Europe on January 17, 1918.
The document runs as follows:
* “The Italian Ambassador in London, Marchese Imperiali, on instructions
from his Government, has the honour to communicate to the Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs, Sir Edward Grey, to the French Ambassador, M.
Cambon, and to the Russian Ambassador, Count Benckendorff, the following
Memorandum:
“Article I.—A military convention is to be concluded without delay between
the general Staffs of France, Great Britain, Russia, and Italy to determine
the minimum number of troops which Russia would have to throw against
Austria-Hungary if the latter should want to concentrate all her forces
For particulars of the negotiations preceding Italy’s entry into the war see Appendix A. (page 79).
* Paragraphs marked with a star are taken from the translation published
in The New Europe. In all other cases the Manchester Guardian version is
followed.
against Italy. Russia should decide mainly to attack Germany. Similarly the
said convention is to regulate the questions relating to armistices, in so
far as such armistices form an essential part of the competence of the
Supreme Army Command.9
“Article 2.—On her part Italy undertakes by all means at her disposal to
conduct the campaign in union with France, Great Britain and Russia against
all the Powers at war with them.
“Article 3.—The naval forces of France and Great Britain are to render
uninterrupted and active assistance to Italy until such time as the navy of
Austria has been destroyed or peace has been concluded. A naval convention
is to be concluded without delay between France, Great Britain and Italy.
“Article 4.—By the future Treaty of Peace Italy is to receive the district
of Trentino10; the entire Southern Tyrol up to its natural geographical
9 The New Europe version reads: “In so far as these (armistices) do not by
their very nature fall within the competence of The Supreme Command.”
10 Trentino is, practically speaking, that part of the valley of the Adige
which runs from the Italian frontier to the town of Bozen. It includes the
towns of Trent, Rovereto, Riva and Ala. Although for hundreds of years a
part of the Holy Roman Empire (Trent itself was governed by a
Prince-Bishop) the population is very largely Italian in race and sympathy.
A correspondent of the Morning Post (April 3rd, 1915) states that whilst
the towns in the valley are predominantly Italian the villages on the
heights are Austrian in sympathy. The Trentino is the old historic highway
into lta]y from Central Europe, through Innsbruck and over the Brenner Pass.
frontier, which is the Brenner Pass11; the city and district of Trieste12;
the county of Gorizia and Gradisca13; the entire Istria14 up to Quarmer,15
including Volosca and the Istrian islands of Cherso and Lussina,15 as well
as the smaller islands of Plavnika,15, Unia, Canidoli, Palazznoli,15 S.
Petri dei Nembi,15 Asinello, and Gruica, with the neighbouring islets.
11 This would bring the Italian frontier to within 20 miles of Innsbruck
and 30 miles of the southern limits of Bavaria. It would annex to Italy a
tract of territory inhabited by the Tyrolese, a virile race of
mountaineers, the descendants of Andreas Hofer and his followers, who are
notorious for their loyal support of the Austrian throne.
12 Trieste has been linked to the Austrian crown for 536 years, ever since,
in fact, 1382, in which year the city voluntarily joined the Empire in
order to be protected against the threatened domination of Venice. It is
the chief port of Austria and the natural outlet for the trade of the
hinterland for as far back as Vienna, Bohemia and even further. Its
inclusion in the Italian Customs Union would tend to the economic
strangulation of the interior and the commercial ruin of the port.
13 According to the last census (1910) the population of the county of
Gorizia and Gradisca is 249,893, of which 90,119 are ltalians, or about 36
per cent. Roughly speaking, the ltalians inhabit the strip of territory
between the Italian frontier and the line of the Isonzo with the town of
Gorizia. The Italian claim to the county of Gorizia and Gradisca, of
course, goes far beyond this, and takes in a practically solid non-ltalian
population.
14 Although there is a considerable Italian population along a thin strip
of the western sea-board of Istria the interior is almost entirely
non-ltalian. The population of Istria is 386,463, of which 147,417 are
Italians, or roughly 38 per cent. The cession of Istria would give to Italy
the great fortress and dockyard of Pola, Austria’s chief naval base. Cherso
and Lussina are large and important islands commanding Fiume and the coast
of Croatia.
15 In The New Europe these place-names are translated: Quarnero, Lussin,
Plavnik, Palazzuola and S. Pietro Nerovio.
*”Note I (to Article 4).—In carrying out what is said in Article 4 the
frontier line shall be drawn along the following points:—From the summit of
Umbrile northwards to the Stelvio, then along the watershed of the Rhoetian
Alps as far as the sources of the rivers Adige and Eisach, then across the
Mounts Reschen and Brenner and the Etz and Ziller peaks. The frontier then
turns southwards, touching Mount Toblach, in order to reach the present
frontier of Carniola, which is near the Alps. Along this frontier the line
will reach Mount Tarvis and will follow the watershed of the Julian Alps
beyond the crests of Predil, Mangart, and Tricorno, and the passes of
Podberdo, Podlansko, and Idria. From here the line will turn in a
south-east direction towards the Schneeberg, in such a way as not to
include the basin of the Save and its tributaries in Italian territory.
From the Schneeberg the frontier will descend towards the sea coast,
including Castua, Mantuglia, and Volosca as Italian districts.
“Article 5.—Italy will likewise receive the province of Dalmatia in its
present frontiers including Lisserica and Trebigne (Trebanj)16 in the
north, and all the country in the south up to a line drawn from the coast,
at the promontory of Planka, eastwards along the watershed in such a way as
to include in the Italian possessions all the valleys of the rivers flowing
into the Sebenico—viz., Cikola, Kerka, and Buotisnica, with all their
affluents. Italy will likewise obtain all the islands situated to the north
and west of the coasts of Dalmatia,
16 Two small places in South-West Croatia.
beginning with Premuda, Selve, Ulbo, Skerda, Maoh, Pago, and Puntadura, and
further north, and down to Melada in the south, with the inclusion of the
islands of S. Andrea, Busi, Lissa, Lesina, Torcola, Curzola, Cazza, and
Lagosta, with all the adjacent, rocks and islets, as well as Pelagosa, but
without the islands of Zirona Grande and Zirona Piccola, Bua, Solta, and
Brazza.17
“The following are to be neutralised:
“(1) The entire coast from Planka, in the north, to the southern extremity
of the Sabbioncello peninsula, includnig this last-named peninsula in its
entirety;
“(2) The part of the littoral from a point ten versts south of the
promontory of Ragusa Vecchia to the Viosa (Vojuzza) River18 so as to
include in the neutralised zone the entire gulf of Cattaro with its ports
of Antivari, Dulcigno, San Giovanni di Medua, and Durazzo; the rights of
Montenegro, arising from the declarations exchanged by the two contracting
parties as far
17 This gives to Italy the whole of Northern Dalmatia which constitutes the
greater part of that province, and includes the ports of Zara and Sebenico.
The islands mentioned are many of them (in particular Lesina, Curzola,
Lissa, and Melada) large and important and command the whole Dalmatian
coast and the port of Spalato. The total population of Dalmatia is 684,855.
Of this number 18,028 are Italians, or a little under 3 per cent. of the
whole. Of these, no fewer than 8,000 are concentrated in the single town of
Zara This leaves only l0,000 Italians for the whole of the rest of
Dalmatia, or about 1 3/4 per cent. of the population. The Dalmatians are a
hardy, sea-faring stock, and provide the bulk of the seamen of the Austrian
Navy and Mercantile marine.
18 The Vojuzza or Vojussa is an Albanian river which flows into the
Adriatic a few miles north of Valona.
back as April and May, 1909, remaining intact.19 Nevertheless, in view of
the fact that those rights were guaranteed to Montenegro within her present
frontiers, they are not to be extended to those territories and ports which
may eventually be given to Montenegro. Thus, none of the ports of the
littoral now belongng to Montenegro are to be neutralised, at any future
time. On the other hand, the disqualifications affecting Antivari, to which
Montenegro herself agreed in 1909, are to remain in force;
“(3) Lastly, all the islands which are not annexed to Italy.
“Note 2.—The following territories on the Adriatic will be included by the
Powers of the Quadruple Entente in Croatia, Serbia, and Montenegro: In the
north of the Adriatic, the entire coast from Volosca Bay, on the border of
Istria, to the northern frontier of Dalmatia, including the entire coast
now belonging to Hungary, and the entire coast of Croatia, the port of
Fiume20 and the small ports of Movi and Carlopago, and also the islands of
Veglia, Perviccio, Gregorio, Coli, and Arbe, 21
19 In April, 1909, following upon the crisis caused by the annexation of
Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary in the previous year, Montenegro
succeeded in obtaining from Austria and the Powers the abrogation of
various restrictions imposed on her tenure of the port of Antivari by
Article 29 of the Treaty of Berlin. It was arranged that Antivari should
retain the character of a commercial port, but the administration of the
maritime police on the Montenegrin coast by Austria-Hungary and the closure
of Antivari to warships of all nations, and other irksome regulations, were
abandoned.
20 Fiume is the chief port of Hungary.
21 Veglia and Arbe are islands of considerable size lying off the coast of
Croatia.
and in the south of the Adriatic, where Serbia and Montenegro have
interests, the entire coast from Planka up to the River Drin22 with the
chief ports of Spalato, Ragusa, Cattaro, Antivari, Dulcigno and San
Giovanni di Medua, with the islands of Zirona Grande, Zirona Piccola, Bua,
Solta, Brazza,23 Jaklian and Calomotta24.
22 The Drin is an Albanian river flowing into the Adriatic close to the
northern frontier of that country.
23 Brazza is a large island lying off the coast of Southern Dalmatia, just
outside Spalato.
24 The effect of Articles 4 and 5, with the notes attached, is as
follows:—After Italy has been given Istria and Northern Dalmatia, the whole
of the rest of the Austro-Hungarian coastline is to be shorn away from her
and divided between a new State of Croatia and an enlarged Serbia and
Montenegro. (According to M. Miliukoff’s statement in the Retch in the
early days of 1917: “it is still a disputed question whether Jugo-Slavia
(the land of the Southern Slavs) should consist of a united Croatia,
Slavonia, Herzegovina, Bosnia, Serbia, and Montenegro, or whether it should
form two separate States”). The result of carrying out the above clauses of
the Treaty of London would be to cut Austria-Hungary completely from the
sea.
THE NEUTRALISATION PROPOSALS: Some readers may wonder why the long stretch
of coastline (which is to be allotted apparently to Serbia and Montenegro)
running from the southern limit of the proposed Italian possession of
Dalmatia to the northern limit of the proposed Italian possession of Valona
(see Article 6), and including the ports of Spalato, Cattaro, S. Giovanni
di Medua, and Durazzo, but seemingly excluding Ragusa, is to be
neutralised. The reason is possibly to be found in the determination of
Italy to allow the presence of no naval Power, save her own, in the
Adriatic, or, in the words of the Giornale d’ltalia already quoted,
“neither a fort, nor a gun, nor a submarine that is not Italian ought to be
in that sea.” Thus Professor G. Salvemini writes: “We cannot prevent
Austria having a fleet, since she already possesses one. The Serbia of
to-morrow we can prevent in its own interests
“Article 6.—Italy will receive in absolute property Valona, the island of
Saseno and as much territory as would be required to secure their military
safety-approximately between the River Vojuzza in the north and in the
east, down to the borders of the Chimara district in the south.25
*”Article 7.—Having obtained Trentino and Istria by Article 4, Dalmatia and
the Adriatic islands by Article 5, and also the Gulf of Valona, Italy
undertakes, in the event of a small autonomous and neutralised State being
formed in Albania, not to oppose the possible desire of France, Great
Britain, and Russia to repartition the northern and southern districts of
Albania between Montenegro, Serbia, and Greece.26 The
and ours. And we can profit by this moment, which will never recur in
history, to exclude from the Adriatic Austria which has a fleet, and to
substitute for her a new State which has no fleet, and which we can prevent
creating one” (quoted by Mr. A. H. E. Taylor, in The Future of the Southern
Slavs. T. Fisher Unwin). Italy secures by this treaty the chief strategic
points on the coast, Cherso and Lussin dominating Fiume, Lissa (the key of
the Central Adriatic) and Lesina closing the door on Spalato, and Melada
threatening Ragusa. Should a Slav State ever be formed with a seaboard on
the Adriatic, such a State would only exist (under the provisions of this
treaty), as far at least as its maritime activities were concerned, at the
good pleasure of Italy, who would be able at any time to land troops upon
the coast and to seize the towns.
25 Valona is the Albanian town situated on the Straits of Otranto and
usually considered to be “the key of the Adriatic.” Saseno is the island at
the mouth of the harbour. Valona with the surrounding districts (to the
extent of about 4,000 square kilometres) has been occupied by Italy since
November, 1914.
26 This contemplates the partition of the greater part of Albania. In any
case, the allotment of San Giovanni di Medua to Serbia or Montenegro (under
Article 5, Note
southern coast of Albania, from the frontier of the Italian territory of
Valona to Cape Stilos, is to be neutralised.27
“To Italy will be conceded the right of conducting the foreign relations of
Albania; in any case, Italy will be bound to secure for Albania a territory
sufficiently extensive to enable its frontiers to join those of Greece and
Serbia to the east28 of the Lake of Ohrida.
“Anticle 8.—-Italy will obtain all the twelve islands (Dodekanese) now
oocupied by her, in full possession.29
2) cuts off Scutari, with a population of 25,000 Albanians, from the sea.
In 1913, the Powers created Albania as an independent State, declared it
neutral, and took it under their protection. According to Miss Durham and
Mr. H. W. Nevinson “more than once since the beginning of the war, they
(the Albanians) have been assured by our Foreign Office that they, too, are
included among the small nations whose rights are to be recognised.”
(Letter to the Manchester Guardian, February 2, 1918.) In the House of
Commons on February 18, 1918, Mr. Balfour, in reply to Mr. R. C. Lambert,
said that the arrangenents come to in 1913, to which Albania was not a
party, by the Great Powers with reference to Albania had ceased to have a
binding force, as all the signatory Powers were engaged in the war. On
November 22, 1914 (according to another secret document, see Appendix B),
Russia, Britain, and France offered to Greece the southern regions of
Albania, with the exception of Valona, on condition that she joined the
Allies.
27 Note again the insistence upon the neutralisation of all the coast not
occupied by Italy.
28 The Manchester Guardian version reads “west.”
29 The Dodekanese are a group of islands-Ikaria, Patmos, Leros, Kalymnos,
Astypalaia, Nisyrus, Telos, Syme, Chalkaia, Karpathos, Kassos, and
Kastellorizzo-lying off the south-east coast of Asia Minor. Italy occupied
all these islands, with the exception of the first and the last, together
with Rhodes and Kos, during
“Article 9.—France, Great Britain, and Russia admit in principle the fact
of Italy’s interest in the maintenance of political balance of power in the
Mediterranean and her rights, in case of a partition of Turkey, to a share,
equal to theirs, in the basin of the Mediterranean-viz., in that part of it
which adjoins the province of Adalia, in which Italy has already acquired
special rights and interests defined in the Italo-British Convention. The
zone which is to be made Italy’s property is to be more precisely defined
in due course in conformity with the vital interests of France and Great
Britain. Italy’s interests will likewise be taken into consideration in
case the Powers should also maintain the territorial integrity of Asiatic
Turkey for some future period of time, and if they should only proceed to
establish among themselves spheres of influence. In case France, Great
Britain and Russia should, in the course of the present war, occupy any
districts of Asiatic Turkey, the entire territory adjacent to Adalia and
defined more precisely below30 is to be left to Italy who reserves her
right to occupy it.31
“Article 10.—In Libya, Italy is to enjoy all those
the Tripolitan War with Turkey, as a pledge for the fulfilment of the
Treaty of Lausanne, which closed that war. Their population is Greek.
30 “Above” in The New Europe version. In any case, it appears to have no
meaning so far as the present document is concerned. It may possibly refer
to another document or to an appendix not yet disclosed.
31 Adalia is situated about mid-way along the southern coast of Asia Minor.
(See page 43 for the terms of the “territorial acquisitions” to be secured
by Britain, France, and Russia in Asiatic Turkey.)
rights and privileges which now belong to the Sultan in virtue of the
Treaty of Lausanne.
“Article 11.—Italy is to get a share in the war indemnity corresponding to
the magnitude of her sacrifices and efforts.
“Article 12.—Italy adheres to the declaration made by France, England, and
Russia about leaving Arabia and the Holy Moslem places in the hands of an
independent Moslem power.32
“Article 13.—Should France and Great Britain extend their colonial
possessions in Africa at the expense of Germany they will admit in
principle Italy’s right to demand certain compensation by way of an
extension of her possessions in Eritrea, Somaliland, and Libya and the
Colonial areas adjoining French and British colonies.”33
“Article 14.—Great Britain undertakes to facilitate for Italy the immediate
flotation on the London market of a loan on advantaeous terms to the amount
of not less than Ł50,000,000.
“Article 15.—France, Great Britain, and Russia pledge themselves to support
Italy in not allowing the representatives of the Holy See to undertake any
diplomatic steps having for their object the conclusion of peace or the
settlement of questions connected with the present war.34
32 See pages 23 and 46.
33 Eritrea is on the Red Sea. Such an extension of Italy’s possessions is
only possible in the case of Eritria and Somaliland at the expense of the
Sudan, French and British Somaliland, British East Africa, or of Abyssinia,
a neutral State. In the case of Libya it is only possible at the expense of
Egypt, Tunis or the French Sahara.
34 The New Europe version reads: “France, Great Britain and Russia undertake
to support Italy, in so far as she does not permit the representatives of
the Holy See, etc.” The word “settlement” in
“Article 16.—The present treaty is to be kept secret. As regards Italy’s
adhesion to the declaration of September 5, 1914 35, this declaration alone
will be published immediately on the declaration of war by, or against,
Italy.
“Having taken into consideration the present Memorandum, the
representatives of France, Great Britain, and Russia, being authorised
thereto, agreed with the representatives of Italy, likewise authorised
thereto, as follows:
“‘France, Great Britain and Russia express their complete agreement with
the present Memorandum submitted to them by the Italian Government. In
respect of Articles 1, 2 and 3 of the present Memorandum, regarding the
coordination of the military and naval operations of all the four Powers,
Italy declares that she will actively intervene at an earliest possible
date, and, at any rate, not later than one month after the signature of the
present document by the contracting parties.’
“The undersigned have confirmed by hand and seal the present instrument in
London in four copies. April 26, 1915.
(Signed) “EDWARD GREY, JULES CAMBON,
“IMPERIALI, BENCKENDORFF.”
line 5 of the above article is translated “regulation” in this version. On
December 20, 1917, in the House of Commons, Lord Robert Cecil said, in
reply to Mr. McKean, that the treaty with Italy did not state that the
representatives of the Holy See should not be allowed to take any
diplomatic steps to bring about peace. On February 14, 1918, in the House
of Commons Lord Robert Cecil in the course of a further statement, said:
“The only thing that this clause does is to say that if Ita1y objects to
the Pope sending a representative to the Peace Conference we would support
that objection.”
35 This is the declaration that the Allies would make peace in common.
THE PRESENT POSITION.
The present position of the treaty is recorded by the following extract
from the official report of the proceedings of the House of Commons
(Tuesday, January 29, 1918):
Mr. Ponsonby: Ought this House not to be informed at this stage of the war
whether the Treaty of London is binding upon this country as regards Italy
or not?
Lord R. Cecil: Any treaty that we enter into, of course, is binding upon us.
Mr. Trevelyan: Has the Government any intention of repudiating it?
Lord R. Cecil: No; it is not the habit of the British Government to
repudiate treaties.
Mr. King: Is not the Noble Lord aware that this treaty is in direct
conflict with the speech of the Prime Minister on the 5th of this month,
and will some opportunity be taken to explain the divergence?
Lord R. Cecil: No, I am not aware of that.
Mr. King: Will the Noble Lord read the speech of the Prime Minister?
Lord R. Cecil: I have read it.
The provisions of this treaty, therefore, are still valid.
III.
The Partition of Asiatic Turkey
(Spring, 1916.)
SUMMARY.—Agreement between Britain, France and Russia as to their “zones of
influence and territorial asquisitions” in Asiatic Turkey. Britain to
obtain Southern Mesopotamia, with Baghdad, and two ports in Syria. France
to obtain Syria, the Adana vilayet, and Western Kurdistan. Russia to obtain
Trebizond, Erzerum, Bitlis, Van, and territory in Southern Kurdistan. An
Arab State or confederation of States to be formed. Palestine to be subject
to a special regime.
[This agreement must be considered in conjunction with the agreement with
Russia concerning Constantinople and the Straits (March, 1915) and the
clause in the Treaty of London dealing with Italy’s claims in Asia Minor
(April 26, 1915).]
At the beginning of the war the Allies “assured Turkey that if she remained
neutral we would see that in the terms of peace Turkey and Turkish
territory would not suffer. The situation was completely changed by the
entry of Turkey into the war . . . and all obligations on the part of the
Allies towards Turkey came to an end.”36
Henceforward the Allies devoted some attention to devising plans for
dealing with Turkish provinces at the
36 Speech of Sir Edward Grey in the House of Commons. October 13, 1915.
43
end of the war, accompanying the efforts of their diplomatists with public
denunciations of the iniquity of Turkish rule in these territories.
In March, 1915, the British Government gave its consent to the annexation
by Russia of Constantinople, the Straits, and other Turkish territory. In
the same month the Allied Ambassadors at Athens offered the Aiden vilayet
in Asiatic Turkey to Greece if she would enter the war immediately (see
Appendix B). In the following April, Britain, France, and Russia admitted
in principle the rights of Italy, “in case of a partition of Turkey, to a
share, equal to theirs, in the basin of the Mediterranean, viz., in that
part of it which adjoins the province of Adalia.” And in the Spring of
1916, Britain, France, and Russia came to an agreement regarding “their
respective zones of influence and territorial acquisitions in Asiatic
Turkey.”
Particulars of this agreement are given in a Memorandum dated March 6,
1917, which was found by M. Trotski among the secret papers of the Russian
Foreign Office. This Memorandum was published in the Isvestia on November
24, 1917, and the following is the full text as printed in the Manchester
Guardian on January 19, 1918:
TEXT OF THE MEMORANDUM.
“As a result of negotiations which took place in London and Petrograd in
the Spring of 1916, the Allied British, French and Russian Governments came
to an agreement as regards the future delimitation of their respective
zones of influence and territorial acquisitions in Asiatic Turkey, as well
as the formation in Arabia of an independent Arab State, or a federation of
Arab
States. The general principles of the agreement are as follows:
“1. Russia obtains the provinces of Erzerum, Trebizond, Van, and Bitlis, as
well as territory in the southern part of Kurdistan, along the line
Mush-Sert-Ibn-Omar-Arnadjie-Persian frontier. The limit of Russian
acquisitions on the Black Sea coast will be fixed later on at a point lying
west of Trebizond.”37
“2. France obtains the coastal strip of Syria, the vilayet of Adana, and
the territory bounded on the south by a line Aintab-Mardin to the future
Russian frontier, and on the north by a line Ala-Dagh-Zara-Egin-Kharput.38
37 Trebizond is an important port on the Black Sea, Erzerum is a strong
fortress in Armenia, Van and Bitlis are considerable towns in Northern
Kurdistan, Van being about 60 miles from the Persian frontier. This
arrangement gives to Russia a large tract of territory running from the
Black Sea for 300 miles in a southeasterly direction to Ibn-Omar, on the
upper Tigris, and thence almost due east for another 150 miles to the
Russian zone in Northern Persia, and including Eastern Armenia and Eastern
Turkestan. As a very rough estimate this territory would cover not less
than 45,000 square miles, and probably rather more.
38 This gives to France an enormous tract of territory. The limits inland
of the coastal strip of Syria are not defined, but it would include the
Lebanon, the towns of Beirut, Tripoli, Antioch and presumably Damascus and
Aleppo. The vilayet of Adana is the large and fertile province in the
south-east angle of Asia Minor (sometimes marked on the maps as Cilicia)
and the remaining territory, which takes in Western Kurdistan, stretches
far inland over rivers and mountains until it reaches the new Russian
frontier on the Tigris. Its valleys are fertile, and there is also
considerable mineral wealth. This territorial concession to France measures
roughly, at its widest parts, from north to south, and from east to west,
500 miles either way. It would form a third Allied barrier to the
Berlin-Baghdad Railway project, the other two being an enlarged Serbia and
a Russian Constantinople.
“3. Great Britain obtains the southern part of Mesopotamia with Baghdad,39
and stipulates for herself in Syria the ports of Haifa and Akka.40
“4. By agreement between France and England, the zone between the French
and the British territories forms a confederation of Arab States, or one
independent Arab State, the zones of influence in which are determined at
the same time.
“5. Alexadretta is proclaimed a free port.41
“With a view to securing the religious interests of the Entente Powers,
Palestine, with the Holy places, is separated from Turkish territory and
subjected to a special regime to be determined by agreement between Russia,
France and England.42
“As general rule the contracting Powers undertake mutually to recognise
the concessions and privileges existing in the territories now acquired by
them which have existed before the war.
“They agree to assume such portions of the Ottoman
39 A British Mesopotamia would of course constitute a fourth barrier to the
Berlin-Baghdad project. Geographically speaking it would fit in with the
possession of the neutral zone of Persia (see page 20) with whose frontiers
it would march. The northern limits of the British conxession are not
indicated.
40 Haifa and Akka are ports on the Mediterranean.
41 Alexandretta is a port on the north-eastern shores of the Meditenranean.
A branch line is to link it up with the Berlin-Baghdad Railway. It is
understood that British authurities regard this port as a natural outlet
for Mesopotamia to the Mediterranean.
42 On November 9, 1917, a letter was published from Mr. Balfour in which
the former stated that “His Majesty’s Government view with favour the
establishment of a national home for the Jewish people.”
Debt such as corresponds to their respective acquisitions.”43
THE PRESENT POSITION.
The Russian Revolutionary Government has definitely repudiated all
territrial annexations, so that the part of this agreement which concerns
Russia falls to the ground.
With regard to the rest of the agreement Mr. Lloyd George has said (January
5, 1918):
“Mesopotamia, Syria and Palestine are, in our judgment, entitled to a
recognition of their separate national conditions. What the exact form of
that recognition in each particular case should be need not here be
discussed, beyond stating that it would be impossible to restore to their
former sovereignty the territories to which I have already referred. Much
has been said about the arrangements we have entered into with our Allies
on this and other subjects. I can only say that, as new circumstances, like
the Russian collapse and the separate Russian negotiations, have changed
the conditions under which those arrangements were made, we are, and always
have been, perfectly ready to discuss them with our Allies.”
In default of any official repudiation we must take it that the agreement
(with the exception of that part of it which relates to Russia) still
stands.
43 On December 3, 1917, in the House of Commons, Lord Robert Cecil stated
that such understandings as had been arrived at by the Powers respecting
Asia Minor did not involve annexations.
What fine distinction, if any, can
be drawn between “annexations” and “territorial acquisitions” it is
difficult to say. Moreover, the Powers agree to take over portions of
the
Ottoman Debt corresponding “to their respective acquisitions.” Is it
possible that Lord Robert Cecil has been misinformed as to the precise
nature of this agreement?
A SECOND AGREEMENT WITH ITALY?—In addition to the London Treaty by which
Italy’s rights, in case of a partition of Turkey, to that part which
adjoins the province of Adalia were recognised, it has been freely stated
that a second agreement has been made with Italy, granting her further
territorial concessions in Asia Minor.
Leading Italian newspapers state that this agreement was reached at the
Conference held in Savoy, in April, 1917, between Mr. Lloyd George, Baron
Sonnino, and M. Ribot.
The Tribuna (the leading Rome paper) of April 25, 1917, describes
“the zone from Smyrna inclusive through the vilayet of Konia up to the
limit Adana” as being “the zone adapted for the satisfaction of those
Italian interests of which the first stone was laid by the concession of
Adalia, and the possession of the Dodekanese.”
The Corriere della Sera (of Milan) of April 27, says:
“We are making no revelations, but only referring to clear expressions of
public opinion in the various Allied countries, in mentioning that while
English interests mainly centre on Mesopotamia, French on Syria, and
Italian on the vilayets of Smyrna, Konia, and Adana, there was a lively
difference and discussion .... on certain points and more especially on
Smyrna, Adana, and Alexandretta .... French opinion claimed all Syria up to
the Anti-Taurus, while English opinion pointed to Alexandretta as the
natural Mesopotamia outlet to the Mediterranean. To settle these
differences, reciprocal and conciliatory arrangements were necessary,
giving compensations and indemnities, where occasion arose, on the general
principle of keeping to prevailing agreements with a minimum of
renunciations.”
If the vilayets of Smyrna, Konia, and Adana have been apportioned to Italy,
that country is to receive the whole of the southern half of Asia Minor up
to the limits (on the East) of the sphere allotted to France at Adana.
The terms of this agreement, if it exists, have not of course been published.
IV.
The Agreement with Roumania
(August 18, 1916.)
SUMMARY.—Roumania to receive Transylvanla up to the River Theiss, the
Bukovina up to the River Pruth, and the Banat.
Although for the first two years of the war Roumania remained neutral,
continuous negotiations were taking place during that period with the
object of securing Roumania’s adhesion to the cause of the Allies.
This we learn from diplomatic documents published at Petrograd. The full
text of these documents is not yet available in this country, but they are
summarised in the following telegram from Mr. Philips Price printed in the
Manchester Guardian of February 8, 1918:
“There are published in the official Soviet organ diplomatic documents on
Roumania’s entry into the war.
“On August 7, 1914, M. Sazonoff proposed in a Note to offer Roumania
Transylvania and to guarantee her former acquisitions in the Dobrudja if
she would enter the war against Austria.44
44 This refers to the territory south of the Danube taken by Roumania from
Bulgaria after the second Balkan War. Simultaneously-or a little later-the
Allies were endeavouring to secure the military assistance of Bulgaria (see
footnote on page 19). In the Manchester Guardian of March 12, 1918, a fuller
version of this note of M. Sazonoff’s is given. Amongst M. Sazonoff’s
proposals are the following: “Russia to pledge herself not to end the war
until all Austro-Hungarian territories indicated on the map attached are
annexed to the Roumanian crown; Roumania to pledge herself to make peace
only in conjunction with Russia.”
49
“On August 12 M. Bratiano replies that he cannot accept the proposal
because of a contrary decision by the Crown Council recently taken; the
question must remain open, but the proposal was attractive, and any
incident might strain the relations of Austria and Roumania, giving the
latter the necessary pretext.
“On September 1 the Russian Ambassador at Bucharest, M. Poklefsky, informs
M. Sazonoff that prominent Roumanian statesman are asking the cession of
Bessarabia45 as the price of Roumanian neutrality.
“On October 3, M. Sazonoff sends to Bucharest a copy of the secret
Russo-Roumanian treaty just signed by himself and the Roumanian Ambassador
at Petrograd, containing the following provisions:
“Russia agrees diplomatically to oppose all attempts against Roumanian
integrity.
“Russia recognises the Roumanian claim to territory with a Roumanian
population.
“The question of the partition of Bukovina is to be handed to a joint
commission.
“Roumania can occupy the territories agreed upon whenever convenient.
“Russia agrees to secure the support of England and France.
“Roumanian neutrality is to include the stoppage of supplies from Germany
to Turkey.”
[Then comes a gap of several months. In the report quoted on pages 55 and
56 the Russian General Polivanov says of this period: “Our successes in
Galicia and Bukovina in 1914 and early 1915, the capture of Lemberg and
Przemysl, and the appearance of our
45 Bessarabia is a Russian province bordering on Roumania, and lying
between the Pruth and the Dniester. Its chief town is Kishinev. The
population is largely of Roumanian stock.
advance guard beyond the Carpathians, brought the question of Roumanian
intervention to a head. “Mr. Philips Price’s telegrarn continues as below.]
“On March 27, 1915, M. Sazonoff informs M. Poklefsky that the Roumanian
Ambassador in London had informed Sir Edward Grey that Roumania was
prepared to enter the war by the side of the Allies in May.
“On May 1 M. Poklefsky informs M. Sazonoff that the Roumanian Government,
through M. Bratiano, demand Transylvania and the Banat, the southern
boundary ot the new territory to be the Danube up to the junction of the
River Theiss; thence the western boundary to run north past Szegedin and
Debreezen46 to the Carpathians; then east to the line of the River Pruth,
including Bukovina. M. Poklefsky pointed out that this was an infringement
of the rights of non-Roumanian nationalities in the Banat, the South
Carpathians, and Bukovina. M. Bratiano replied that it would be possible to
waive the claim to the South Carpathians, but he must insist on the Banat.
“On May 3 M. Sazonoff informs the Ambassadors in London and Paris that the
Roumanian terms were unacceptable.
“On June 23, M. Poklefsky informs M. Sazonoff of M. Bratiano’s satisfaction
that Russia would agree to cede Bukovina, with Tchernovitz47 to Roumania,
but that he was dissatisfied because Russia would not agree that Roumania
should have the Banat. M. Poklefsky added that M. Bratiano might agree to
establish a
46 Szegedin is a Hungarian town situated at the junction of the Rivers
Maros and Theiss. Debreczen is a town in the north of Hungary, about 120
miles due east of Buda-Pesth.
47 Tchernovitz or Czernowitz is the chief town of Bukovina.
neutral zone in the Banat, but even this was doubtful, since the Russian
retreat in Poland and Galicia was hardening Roumanian terms.
“On July 8 the Russian Ambassador in Paris, M. Isvolsky, informs M.
Sazanoff that M. Delcassé has told him that the London Cabinet agrees to
the cession of the Banat to Roumania.
“M. Sazonoff replied the following day that Roumania must give an
undertaking not to Roumanise the Serbs of the Banat.
“On July 11 M. Isvolsky telegraphs to M. Sazonoff that M. Delcassé fears
the demands for a Roumanian guarantee for the Serbs of the Banat will cause
trouble and delay Roumania’s entry.”
[Here comes a gap of over twelve months. What has happened during this
period? A possible explanation is to be found in the following extract from
a report signed by General Polivanov (Russian Minister of War) on November
7 (20), 1916, and published amongst the Russian diplomatic documents:—
“At the end of May,” he says-that is, May, 1915-”our retreat from Galicia
and Poland took place, and Bukovina was abandoned, and the feelings of
leading circles in Roumania correspondingly changed. The negotiations for
intervention came of their own accord to a standstill.
“At the end of 1915 and early in 1916, after the destruction of Serbia and
Bulgaria’s intervention, Roumanian policy leaned very noticeably towards
the side of our enemies. At that time the Roumanian Government concluded a
whole series of very advantageous commercial agreements with
Austria-Hungary and Germany. This circumstance forced our military,
financial, and commercial authorities to show great caution in the question
of the export from Russia to Roumania of war material and various other
supplies, such as might fall into the hands of our enemies.
“In consequence of the brilliant offensive of General Brusilov in the
Spring and Summer, 1916, Roumanian neutrality leaned once more to the side
of the Entente Powers, and there arose the
possibility of renewing the interrupted negotiations for Roumanian
intervention. It is to be observed that, from the first, the Chief of
Staff, for military reasons, held the neutrality of Roumania to be more
advantageous for us than her active intervention in the war. Later on,
General Alexeieff adopted the point of view of the Allies, who looked upon
Roumania’s entry as a decisive blow for Austria-Hungary and as the nearing
of the war’s end.”]
NEGOTIATIONS RENEWED IN 1916.
Evidently new proposals were now put forward by Roumania, for Mr. Price’s
telegram continues as follows:
“On July 29, 1916, the Russian Premier, M. Stürmer, telegraphs to the
Ambassadors in Paris, London, and Rome that Roumania’s new terms are
unacceptable to Russia, especially the obligation that the Allies should
continue the war till all Roumanian desires were realised, and that the
Allies should recognise Roumania on the same footing as the Great Powers.
M. Stürmer proposes a firm statement to Bucharest that the Allies’ terms
are final, and that the Serbs of the Banat must be guaranteed from
Roumanisation.
“On August 2 M. Isvolsky informs M. Sazonoff of the nervousness of the
French Government because the offensive on the Somme had not given the
desired results; therefore the entrance of Roumania into the war was
particularly desirable now.
“On August 9 President Poincare telegraphs to the Tsar the desirability of
an immediate agreement with Roumania.
“The Tsar replies that the Roumanian terms are excessive.
“On August 7 England and France agree to make
an advance on the Salonika front to relieve Roumania from Bulgarian
pressure if Roumania enters the war.
“On August 8 the Russian Premier, M. Stürmer, agrees to abandon the demand
for guarantees for the Serbs of the Banat against Roumanisation.
”On the same day the text of an agreement between the Allies and Roumania
is prepared, giving satisfaction to all Roumania’s claims to the Banat,48
Transylvanla up to the Theiss,49 and Bukovina up to the Pruth.50
48 The Banat of Temesvar is a country of mixed nationality, stretching from
the borders of Roumania and Transylvania on the east to the River Theiss on
the west, and bounded on the south by the Danube and north by the River
Moris. Its population includes Serbs, Roumanians, Magyars, Szekels,
Germans, Slovaks, and other races. The western parts are mainly Serb, the
northern parts mainly German and Magyar, and the eastern parts mainly
Roumanian, with large Serb, German, and Magyar “islands.” By the census of
1910 the population of the Banat was 1,582,133, of which 592,049 were
Roumanians, or about 37 1/2 per cent. Thus a large majority of the
population is non-Roumanian.
49 Transylvanla to the Theiss. Transylvania is divided from Roumania by the
Carpathians, and, except for a few years at the end of the sixteenth
century, has always been linked to Hungary. The latter country is divided
into two parts by the River Theiss, which runs from north to south.
Practically the whole of the immense territory to the east of this river-a
good half of Hungary-is, by this agreement, to be given to Roumania.
Undoubtedly in Transylvania proper a large part of the population is of
Roumanian stock-although it contains important Szekel and Saxon
“islands”-but by making the River Theiss the boundary many districts which
are overwhelmingly Magyar would be included in the ceded territory. The
rich lands around Debreczen and bordering on the Theiss are, for example,
the purest Magyar districts in Hungary, and Debreczen itself is the
stronghold of Magyar Calvinism. The important Magyar towns of Grosswardein
and Arad are also by this treaty to be handed over to Roumania. Indeed,
taking this territory as a whole, the majority of its population is
non-Roumanian.
“M. Stürmer, in a Memorandum to the Tsar, however, raises the objection
that Roumania must not be regarded as on a footing with the Great Powers,
and the latter must not be bound to continue the war till all Roumania’s
territorial claims are realised, since this would cause serious
complications over the Constantinople Straits.
“On August 9 M. Poklefsky telegraphs that M. Bratiano is very dissatisfied
with clause 5 of the proposed treaty, providing that the Allies should not
guarantee territorial acquisitions for Roumania by force of arms, and
threatens, if this point be not conceded, to resign and leave the
Government of Roumania to the Germanophils.
“On August 12 M. Isvolsky telegraphs to M. Sazonoff that M. Briand does not
insist on the maintenance of Clause 5, because if the Allies are victorious
they can oarry out their promises, but if only partially successful
Roumania will be forced to bow to circumstances.
”On August 12 the Tsar agrees to all the Roumanian terms.
“The Secret Treaty was signed on August 18, the Salonika advance was to
take place on August 20, and the entrance ot Roumania on August 28. . .”51
GENERAL POLIVANOV’S REPORT.
The above arrangement is confirmed by the report
50 The Bukovina (or land of the Beeches) is situated east of the
Carpathians at the meeting-point of Austria, Russia, and Roumania. It is an
Austrian Duchy, with a Diet of its own. Its population is roughly 800,000,
of which number about 260,000 are Roumanians, or one-third of the total.
51 The conclusion of Mr. Price’s telegram is given on page 57.
of General Polivanov already mentioned, written after the retreat of the
Roumanian armies. He says:
* “In August, 1916, a military and political agreement was signed with
Roumania, which assigned to her such accessions of territory (Bukovina and
all Transylvania), as quite obviously did not correspond to the measure of
Roumania’s share of military operations, since she had undertaken only to
declare war on Austria-Hungary, and had confined herself to operations in
Transylvania. . . . From the standpoint of Russian interests we must be
guided by the following considerations in judging the present situation in
Roumania. If things had developed in such a way that the military and
political agreement of 1916 with Roumania had been fully realised, then a
very strong State would have arisen in the Balkans, consisting of Moldavia,
Wallachia, the Dobrudja52, and of Transylvania, the Banat, and Bukovina
(acquisitions under the treaty of 1916) with a population of about
13,000,000. In the future this State could hardly have been friendly
disposed towards Russia, and would scarcely have abandoned the design of
realising its national dreams in Bessarabia and the Balkans. Consequently,
the collapse of Roumania’s plans as a Great Power is not particularly
opposed to Russia’s interests. This circumstance must be exploited by us in
order to strengthen for as long as possible those compulsory ties which
link Russia with Roumania. Our successes on the Roumanian front are for us
of
* This version appeared in The New Europe (December 27, 1917).
52 These three provinces constitute the Roumanian State as it existed
before the war.
extraordinary importance, as the only possibility of deciding once for all
in the sense we desire the question of Constantinople and the Straits. The
events now occurring in Roumania have altered to their very foundation the
conditions of the treaty of 1916. Instead of the comparatively modest
military support which Russia was pledged to provide in the Dobrudja, she
had to assign the defence of the Roumanian territory on all sides almost
exclusively to Russian troops. This military aid on the part of Russia has
now assumed such dimensions that the promise of territorial compensations
to Roumania prescribed in the treaty in return for her entry into the war
must undoubtedly be submitted to revision.
(Signed) “POLIVANOV.”
The following is the conclusion of Mr. Price’s telegram to the Manchester
Guardian:
“On September 10 General Alexeieff, replying to the Roumanian demands
through the General Staff for military assistance after the loss of
Turtukai, expresses doubt of the wisdom of the whole Roumanian campaign,
which widens the Russian front by 500 versts and requires 200,000 more
Russian troops. Russia, he says, with 100 versts of front in Europe and
over 1000 versts in Asia, can ill-afford this extension of front from a
strategic point of view.
“After the Russian Revolution M. Miliukoff,53 on May 8, 1917, records in a
Memorandum that the Serbian Government desires the reconsideration of the
question of the Banat on the basis of peace wlthout annexation, but M.
Miliukoff oonsiders that since
53 The new Russian Foreign Minister.
Russia has just declared her loyalty to the treaties with the Allies such a
step is inadmissible.
“On May 19 M. Poklefsky, from Jassy, informs M. Terestchenko54 that M.
Bratiano had just returned from Petrograd; though somewhat disquieted by
the internal situation in Russia, he is convinced that the Provisional
Government is determined to carry on the war to a victorious end. M.
Bratiano, in Petrograd, had energetically protested against the programme
of the Petrograd Soviet for peace without annexations if this meant the
abandonment by Roumania of Transylvanla and the Banat, but he had obtained
an official assurance that the programme of the Soviet did not bind the
Provisional Government.”
THE PRESENT POSITION.
Mr. Lloyd George, in his speech of January 5, 1918, said:
“We also mean to press that justice be done to men of Roumanian blood and
speech in their legitimate aspirations.”
The latest statement of the British attitude on the point was made by Lord
Robert Cecil, in the House of Commons on February 15, 1918, when, in reply
to Mr. King, he said that the treaty entered into by Britain on August 18,
1916, whereby the entry of Roumania into the war was secured, was still
operative, and subsequent events or understandings had not altered its
effect.
54 Russian Foreign Minister in the Coalition Government under Prince Lvoff,
which was formed on May 16, after the resignationof M. Miliukoff.
V.
Treaty Between Russia and Japan
(July 3, 1916,)
SUMMARY.—The two Governments to agree to take common action to prevent the
political domination of China by any third Power hostile to Russia and
Japan.
On July 13, 1911, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was signed. Amongst other
objects this Alliance was to
“ensure the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire and the
principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations
in China.”
On August 23, 1914 Japan declared war against Germany. On the following day
a message from Count Okuma, the Japanese Premier, appeared in the
Independent Magazine of New York. The message ran:
“As Premier of Japan, I have stated, and I now again state to the people of
America and of the world that Japan has no ulterior motive, no desire to
secure more territory, no thought of depriving China or othor people of
anything which they now possess. My Government and my people have given
their word and their pledge, which will be as honourably kept as Japan
always keeps promises.”
On January 18, 19l5, after the fall of Kiao-Chau, Japan confronted China
with a list of 21 demands. These demands were of a formidable character and
practically
59
amounted to the placing of China in a position of tutelage to Japan.55
Negotiations proceeded for some time, and eventually, after certain
representations had been made by the United States of America, the demands
were somewhat modified. These modified demands, after the presentation of
an ultimatum by Japan, were finally accepted by China on May 9, 1915.
THE PUBLIC RUSSO-JAPANESE TREATY.
In July, 1916, Japan and Russia entered into a public treaty, the terms of
which were communicated to the British Government before signature. The
terms of this agreement, as published in the Times on July 8,1916, are as
follows:—
“The Imperial Gcvernment of Japan and the Imperial Government of Russia,
resolved to unite their
55 Japan’s demands on China were described in the Daily News and Leader
(March 19, 1915) in the following words:—
“They would convert the province of Shantung into a Japanese sphere of
influence; they would make South Manchuria and Eastern Mongolia, for
practical purposes, Japanese provinces; they would give Japan a monopoly of
the vast mineral wealth of the Yangtse valley, incidental to which would be
the power to sever Northern from Southern China; they would give Japan the
control of China’s war munitions; they would hand over the policing of
important areas of China to Japan; they would set Japanese experts in
control of China’s political, military, and financial affairs; they would
set up a Monroe doctrine operative against all Powers except Japan, they
would open all China to the enterprise of Japanese political missionaries.
A scheme of this kind, if carried through, would put all China under
Japanese suzerainty. Of course it would also imperil extensive British
commercial and industrial interests in China, and it would knock the bottom
out of the Anglo-Japanese treaty, which guaranteed the integrity of China
and equality of opportunity to all Powers.”
| 61 | RUSSO-JAPANESE TREATY | 61 |
efforts for the maintenance of lasting peace in the Far East, have agreed
upon the following:—
“Article 1.—Japan will not be a party to any political arrangement or
combination directed against Russia.
“Russia will not be a party to any political arrangement or combination
directed against Japan.
“Article 2.—Should the territorial rights or the special interests in the
Far East of one of the contracting parties recognised by the other
contracting party be threatened, Japan and Russia will take counsel of each
other as to the measures to be taken in view of the support or the help to
be given in order to safeguard and defend those rights and interests.”
THE SECRET RUSSO-JAPANESE TREATY.
The above treaty, as already stated, was a public one. But at the very same
time Russia and Japan entered into a Secret Treaty consisting of six
articles. This treaty was first published in the Isvestia, and a
translation appeared in the Manchester Guardian on February 1, 1918.
This treaty was signed on July 3, 1916. It runs as follows:—
“Ths Russian Imperial Government and the Japanese Imperial Government have,
with a view to the greater consolidation of their close friendship,
established between them by the secret agreements of July 30, 1907, July 4,
1910, and July 8, 1912, agreed to supplement the above-mentioned secret
agreements by the following articles:—
“Article 1.—The two high contracting parties acknowledge that the vital
interests of both require the safeguarding of China against the political
domination by any third Power entertaining hostile designs towards Russia
or Japan, and therefore mutually pledge themselves, each time when
circumstances demand it, to enter into frank relations based on complete
mutual trust with one another with a view to talking joint measures for the
prevention of the possibility of the advent of such a state of affairs (in
China).
“Article 2.—If as the result of the measures taken by mutual agreement by
Russia and Japan, in virtue of the preceding article, war should be
declared by the third Power referred to in Article 1 of the present
Convention on either of the contracting parties, the other party shall on
the first demand of its Ally come to its assistance, and each of the high
contracting parties pledges itself hereby, in case such a situation should
arise, not to conclude peace with the common enemy without the previous
consent of its Ally.
“Antiale 3.—The terms on which each high contracting party is to render
armed assistance to the other in accordance with the preceding article, as
well as the form in which this assistance is to be rendered, shall be
determined jointly by the respective competent authorities of the two
contracting parties.
“Article 4.—Provided that neither high contracting party shall regard
itself bound by Article 2 of the present Convention in respect af rendering
armed assistance to its Ally so long as it has not
| 63 | RUSSO-JAPANESE TREATY | 63 |
been given guarantees by its Allies that they, too, will render such
assistance to it as would correspond to the seriousness of the impending
conflict.
“Article 5.—The present Convention enters into force from the moment of its
signature, and shall remain in force until July, 1921. Should one of the
high contracting parties not deem it necessary, twelve months before the
expiry of this term, to give notice of its unwillingness to prolong the
validity of the present Convention, the latter shall remain in force for a
period of one year after it has been denounced by one or other of the high
oontracting parties.
“Article 6.—The present Convention shall be kept in complete secrecy from
everybody except the two high contracting parties.
“In witness whereof the undersigned have confirmed the present instrument
by hand and seal at Petrograd, June 20 (July 3), 1916, corresponding to the
Japanese date of Thursday, seventh month and fifth year in the reign of
Taise.
(Signed) SAZONOFF, MOTONO.”56
56 The Manchester Guardian (Dec. 24, 1917), which had previously printed a
summary of this Secret Treaty, points out that there are considerable
differences between the secret and the public agreements. “The public
treaty professes to aim at maintaining a lasting peace in the Far East, and
makes no specific reference to China; the Secret Treaty is not concerned
with peace, but with the ‘interests’ of both contracting Powers in
China.... The public treaty indicates consultation between the contracting
parties as to the measures to be taken, the Secret Treaty points to
military measures and is definitely a military alliance.”
THE PRESENT POSITION.
Russia has withdrawn from this treaty. Since then an agreement has been
arrived at between Japan and the United States of America by means of an
interchange of notes betweer Mr. Lansing, the U.S. Secretary of State, and
Viscount Ishii, the head of the Japanese Mission to America. The text of
these notes was communicated tothe British Government before signature.
Mr. Lansing’s note, which is dated November 2, 1917, states:—
“.... The Governments of the United States and Japan recognise that
territorial propinquity creates special relations between countries, and
consequently the Government of the United States recognises that Japan has
special interests57 in China, particularly in that part to which her
possessions are contiguous
“The territorial sovereignty of China nevertheless remains unimpaired, and
the Government af the United States has every confidence in the repeated
assurances of the Imperial Japanese Government that, while geographical
position gives Japan such special interests, they have no desire to
discriminate against the trade of other nations or to disregard the
commercial rights heretofore granted by China in the treaties with other
Powers.
“The Governments of the United States and Japan deny that they have any
purpose to infringe in any way the independence or territorial integrity of
China, and declare, furthermore, that they will always adhere to the
principle of the so-called open door or equal opportunity for commerce and
industry in Chinas”
“Moreover, they mutually declare that they are opposed to the acquisition
by any Government of any special rights or privileges that would affect the
independence or territorial integrity of China, or that would deny to the
subjects or citizens of any country the full enjoyment of equal opportunity
in the commerce and industry of China.”
57 See pages 87 and 88.
| 65 | RUSSO-JAPANESE TREATY | 65 |
Viscount Ishii replied the same day confirming the agreement in identical
terms.*
[Further diplomatic documents have been published at Petrograd referring to
the territorial aims of Japan and also to the interpretation of the term
“special interests” in the Japanese-American agreement. These are given in
Appendix C.]
* A Reuter message from New York, dated November 12, 1917, says: “Mr. Koo,
the Chinese Minister at Washington, has lodged a formal protest with the
State Department against the Japanese-American agreement regarding China.
While the document has not been made public, it is understood that China
objects to any agreement affecting China without reference to the wish of
the Chinese people.”
VI.
Re-Drawing the Frontiers of Germany
(February, 1917.)
SUMMARY.—Agreement between France and Russia. Russia to support France in
her demands for Alsace-Lorraine, and the Saar Valley; the rest of the
German territories on the left bank of the Rhine to be constituted a
neutral State. France, in return, “recognises Russia’s complete liberty in
establishing her Western frontiers.”
An important series of documents relates to the question of re-drawing the
frontiers of the Central Powers, and, in particular, to the proposal to
push back the Western frontier of Germany to the Rhine. They were printed
by the Manchester Guardian on December 12, 1917.
The series begins with a confidential telegram from the Russian Minister of
Foreign Affairs (M. Sazonoff) to the Russian Ambassador at Paris.
It is dated February 24 (March 9),1916, and is as follows:
(No. 948)
“Petrograd.
“Please refer to my telegram No. 6063 of 1915. At the forthcoming
Conference you may be guided by the following general principles:
67
“The political agreements concluded between the Allies during the war must
remain intact, and are not subject to revision. They include the agreement
with France and England on Constantinople, the Straits, Syria, and Asia
Minor, and also the London Treaty with Italy. All suggestions for the
future delimitation of Central Europe are at present premature, but in
general one must bear in mind that we are prepared to allow France and
England complete freedom in drawing up the Western frontiers of Germany, in
the expectation that the Allies on their part would allow us equal freedom
in drawing up our frontiers with Germany and Austria.
“It is particularly necessary to insist on the exclusion of the Polish
question from the subject of international discussion and on the elimination
of all attempts to place the future of Poland under the guarantee and the
control of the Powers.58
“With regard to the Scandinavian States, it is necessary to endeavour to
keep back Sweden from any action hostile to us, and at the same time to
examine betimes measures for attracting Norway on our side in case it
should prove impossible to prevent a war with Sweden.
“Roumania has already been offered all the political
58 It is interesting to compare this declaration of the Russian Government
in February, 1916, with President Wilson’s statement in his speech to the
American Senate on January 22, 1917. President Wilson said: “I take it for
granted . . . that statesmen everywhere are agreed that there should be a
united, independent, and autonomous Poland,” and, speaking at Leeds on
September 26, 1917, Mr. Asquith said: “There is Poland, as to whom, I, and,
I believe, all our people, heartily endorse the wise and generous words of
President Wilson.”
advantages which could induce her to take up arms, and therefore it would
be perfectly futile to search for new baits in this respect.59
“The question of pushing out the Germans from the Chinese market is of very
great importance, but its solution is impossible without the participation
of Japan. It is preferable to examine it at the Economic Conference, where
the representatives of Japan will be present. This does not exclude the
desirability of a preliminary exchange of views on the subject between
Russia and England by diplomatic means.
(Signed) “SAZONOFF.”
At some later period the French Government approached the Russian
Government with certain proposals respecting Alsace and the Rhine. This is
recorded in the following confidential telegram from M. Pokrovsky (M.
Sazonoff’s second successor as Foreign Minister) to the Russian Ambassador
at Paris.
It is dated January 30 (February 12), 1917.
(No. 502).
“Petrograd.
“Copy to London confidentially.60 At an audience with the Most High61 M.
Doumergue62 submitted to the Emperor the desire of France to secure for
herself at the end of the present war the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine
and a special position in the valley of the
59 See pages 49-52.
60 Mr. Balfour stated (House of Commons, December 19, 1917) that “London”
did not mean the British Foreign Office. He added: “We had never heard of
it at all at that time.” “London,” therefore probably means the Russian
Embassy in London.
61 The Tsar.
63 French Ambassador at Petrograd.
River Saar as well as to attain the political separation from Germany of
her trans-Rhenish districts and their organisation on a separate basis in
order that in future the River Rhine might form a permanent strategical
frontier against a Germanic invasion. Doumergue expressed the hope that the
Imperial Government would not refuse immediately to draw up its assent to
these suggestions in a formal manner.
“His Imperial Majesty was pleased to agree to this in principle, in
consequence of which I requested Doumergue, after communicating with his
Government, to let me have the draft of an agreement, which would then be
given a formal sanction by an exchange of Notes between the French
Ambassador and myself.
“Proceeding thus to meet the wishes of our Ally, I nevertheless consider it
my duty to recall the standpoint put forward by the Imperial Government in
the telegram of February 24, 1916, No. 948, to the effect that ‘while
allowing France and England complete liberty in delimiting the Western
frontiers of Germany, we expect that the Allies on their part will give us
equal liberty in delimiting our frontiers with Germany and Austria Hungary.’
“Hence the impending exchange of Notes on the question raised by Doumergue
will justify us in asking the French Government simultaneously to confirm
its assent to allowing Russia freedom of action in drawing up her future
frontiers in the west.63 Exact data on the question will be supplied by us
in due course to the French Cabinet.
“In addition we deem it necessary to stipulate for the assent of France to
the removal at the termination of
63 i.e., the west of Russia.
the war of the disqualifications resting on the Aland Islands.64 Please
explain the above to Briand and wire the results.
(Signed) “POKROVSKY.”
A telegram from that Russian Ambassador in Paris to M. Pokrovsky. January
31 (February 13),1917.
No. 88.
“Copy to London. Referring to your telegram, No. 507, confidentially, I
immediately communicated in writing its contents to Briand, who told me
that he would not fail to give me an official reply of the French
Government, but that he could at once declare, on his own behalf, that the
satisfaction of the wishes contained in your telegram will meet with no
difficulties.
(Signed) “ISVOLSKY.”
AN AGREEMENT REACHED.
On February 1 (14), 1917, the Russian Foreign Minister addressed the
following note to the French Ambassador at Petrograd:
“In your Note of to-day’s date your Excellency was good enough to inform
the Imperial Government that the Government of the Republic was
contemplating the inclusion in the terms of peace to be offered to Germany
the following demands and guarantees of a territorial nature:
64 The Aland Islands are situated at the entrance of the Gulf of Bothnia,
close to the Swedish coast, and less than 100 miles from Stockholm. They
belong to Russia, and after the Crimean War a Convention, which was annexed
to the Treaty of Paris, was made between Russia, France, and Britain that
they should not be fortified and that no military or naval establishments
should be maintained upon them. The population of these islands is Swedish
by descent, and numbers about 19,000.
“1. Alsace-Lorraine to be restored to France.65
“2. The frontiers are to be extended at least up to the limits of the
former principality of Lorraine, and are to be drawn up at the discretion
of the French Government so as to provide for the strategical needs and for
the inclusion in French territory of the entire iron district of Lorraine
and of the entire coal district of the Saar Valley.66
“3. The rest of the territories situated on the left bank of the Rhine
which now form part of the German Empire are to be entirely separated from
Germany and freed from all political and economic dependence upon her.67
“4. The territories of the left bank of the Rhine outside French territory
are to be constituted an autonomous and neutral State, and are to be
occupied by French troops until such time as the enemy States have
completely satisfied all the conditions and guarantees indicated in the
Treaty of Peace.
“Your Excellency stated that the Government of the Republic would be happy
to be able to rely upon the support of the Imperial Government for the
carrying out of its plans. By order of his Imperial Majesty my
65 On January 5, 1918, Mr. Lloyd George said: “We mean to stand by the
French democracy to the death in the demand they make for a reconsideration
of the great wrong of 1871.”
66 The Saar Valley contains valuable coal-mines. Its population is
predominantly German.
67 This would include Rhenish-Prussia with the cities and towns of Cologne,
Aix-la-Chapelle, Coblenz, Treves, Crefeld and Bonn, a detached fragment of
Oldenburg; a part of Hesse, with the towns of Mayence, Worms and Bingen;
and the Palatinate with the towns of Ludwigshafen, Kaiserslautern,
Zweibrucken, Neustadt, and Landau.
most august master, I have the honour, in the name of the Russian
Government, to inform your excellency by the present Note that the
Government of the Republic may rely upon the support of the Imperial
Government for the carrying out of its plans as set out above.”
Finally, on February 20 (March 11),1917, the Russian Ambassador at Paris
sent the following telegram to M. Pokrovsky:
(No. 168).
“See my reply to telegram No. 167, No. 2. The Government of the French
Republic, anxious, to confirm the importance of the treaties concluded with
the Russian Government in 1916, for the settlement on the termination of
the war of the question of Constantinople and the Straits in accordance
with Russia’s aspirations, anxious, on the other hand, to secure for its
Ally in military and industrial respects all the guarantees desirable for
the safety and the economic development of the Empire, recognises Russia’s
complete liberty in establishing her Western frontiers.
(Signed) “ISVOLSKY.”
On the very next day (March 12) the Russian Revolution took place and on
March 15 the Tsar abdicated.
THE PRESENT POSITION.
Apparently the design of driving Germany back to the left bank of the Rhine
has now been abandoned by the French Government, although there has been no
official statement to this effect.
Mr. Balfour, in the House of Commons on December 19, 1917, said of this plan:
“We have never expressed our approval of it, nor do I believe it represents
the policy of successive French Govern-
ments who have held office during the war. Never did we desire, and never
did we encourage the idea, that a bit of Germany should be cut off from the
parent State and erected into some kind of . . . independent Government on
the left bank of the Rhine. His Majesty’s Government were never aware that
was seriously entertained by any French statesman.”
It must be noted in this connection that by the Declaration of September 5,
1914 the Allies undertook to make peace in common. Any arrangement between
France and Russia, therefore, equally affects Great Britain.
Conclusion
Some of the arrangements outlined in the preceding pages are now, of
course, obsolete. Before making a separate peace the Russian Government not
only repudiated any desire to annex Constantinople but also repudiated any
desire for annexations of any sort. Mr. Lloyd George himself has said that
as “new circumstances . . . have changed the conditions under which these
arrangements were made we are . . . perfectly ready to discuss them with
our Allies.” Sir George Buchanan, whilst British Ambassador at Petrograd,
spoke (December 9, 1917) to the Russian Press of the “higher principles . .
. of a democratic peace, peace which accords with the wishes of smaller and
weaker nationalities, which repudiates the idea . . . of incorporating in
great empires the territories of reluctant populations.” These are wise
words. Surely it is not too much to ask the Allied Governments to revise
their war-aims in accordance with these higher principles, to repudiate
publicly and collectively all designs of Imperialistic conquest-designs
which, if carried out, would only breed fresh wars-and to re-state their
terms in such a just, moderate, and reasonable way as might, in the words
of Lord Lansdowne, give an “immense stimulus . . . to the peace party in
Germany,” open the way to immediate peace negotiations on the basis of no
annexations and no indemnities, and bring the war to a close “in time to
avert a world-wide catastrophe.”
75
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8 & 9 JOHNSON’S COURT
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E.C.4
ALSO AT MANCHESTER
APPENDICES
Appendix A.
THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH ITALY.
Particulars of the negotiations which preceded Italy’s entry into the war
are given in the following Memorandum, which appeared in the Manchester
Guardian on February 7, 1918. The document of which this is a translation
was found in the archives of the Russian Foreign Office:
A MEMORANDUM OF THE RUSSIAN FOREIGN OFFICE.
“The question of wresting Italy from the Triple Alliance of that time, and
of prevailing upon her to join the Allies arose at the very beginning of
the war. The attempt was unsuccessful.
“Prince Bulow’s mission to Rome only led to the change in Italian policy
being delayed for half a year. The German representatlve strove to buy
Italy’s neutrality with the price of concessions at Austria’s expense. The
monarchy of the Danube was unwilling to follow this course.
“In view of the fruitlessness of this bargaining, in the latter half of
February, 1915, the possibility of Italy joining the Allies arose once more.
“At that time, the Russian Government did not see any imperative necessity
for Italy’s intervention in the affairs of the Allies. The Minister of
Foreign Affairs expressed his apprehension that the appearance of a fourth
European British (sic.) member in the coalition might complicate the
relations between the Allies. While he did not oppose the plan for drawing
Italy into the Alliance, S. D. Sazanoff considered that in any case the
initiative in this matter should proceed from her herself.
79
“Negotiations were formally begun in London at the end of February (O.S.)
on the initiative of the Italian Ambassador, Marchese Imperiali. They were
conducted by Sir E. Grey and the Ambassadors M. Paul Cambon, of France;
Count Benckendorff, of Russia; and the above-mentioned Italian.
“They became involved, however, on the one hand, by Prince Bulow’s
continued efforts to incline the Cabinet of Vienna to make the concessions
to Italy, and, on the other hand, by the contradictoriness of the interests
being defended by the representatives of the Great Powers in London.
“France and Russia considered Italy’s demands to be exorbitant, the former
with regard especially to the question of the south-eastern shores of the
Adriatic, and the latter with regard to the north-east of this sea. Six
weeks were spent deciding the details of the future territorial disposition
of Albania and Dalmatia. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
persistently defended the interests of the Southern Slavs, and maintained
that an outlet to the sea should be permanently assured to Serbia, step by
step repelling Italy’s desires for the extensions of her sea-shores and for
the neutralisation of the regions intended for Serbia. In the meanwhile the
events at the different theatres of war caused the military leaders to
consider the urgency for Italy’s immediate intervention on the side of the
Allies. In the beginning of April (O.S.) the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
while not particularly intent on conforming to the desire of the Allies to
sign a convention with Italy, began to set forth new demands, namely, the
urgency for persuading that kingdom to the earliest possible active
intervention. Besides that, the Russians demanded (1) the settling of the
time for the publication of the convention, and (2) of the avowal of the
inviolability of the agreements previously concluded between the three
Great Powers of the coalition.
“On April 13 (26), the convention was signed in London by Grey, Cambon,
Count Benckendorff, and Marchese Imperiali. In the days immediately
preceding this event, we succeeded in obtaining a few more concessions from
Italy on behalf of Serbia and Montenegro.”
Appendix B.
THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH GREECE.
Particulars of the negotiations which took place between the Allies and
Greece are given in the following message from Mr. M. Philips Price,
printed in the Manchester Guardian on December 7, 1917:—
”Petrograd.
“The following is an extract of a document discovered here in the Foreign
Office recently, describing the relations of the Allies and Greece:—
“‘SECTION I.
“‘On November 22, 1914, the Allied Ambassadors at Athens offered Greece
South Albania, except Vallona,68 if Greece would immediately join the
Allies. M. Venizelos replied demanding guarantees from Roumania that
Bulgaria should not attack Greece. This was not given, and the proposal
fell through.
“‘SECTION II.
“‘On January 2, 1915, the British Ambassador at Athens told M. Venizelos
that if Greece enters the war the Allies will grant her territory on the
shores of Asia Minor. On January 20 M. Venizelos gave the Ambassador
details of Greece’s demands in Asia Minor, but the negotiations were
interrupted by the negotiations with Bulgaria to induce her to enter, the
war on the Allies’ side, and in the meantime M. Venizelos resigned. On
March 9 M. Gounaris expressed the desire that Greece should continue
negotiations. On March 30 the Allied Ambassadors offered Greece the Aidin
vilayet69 (Asiatic Turkey) if Greece would enter the war immediately. On
68 See Note on page 37.
69 Aidin is situated on the south-west of Asia Minor, not far from Smyrna.
81
April 1 M. Gounaris declared the
willingness of Greece to enter if the Allies would guarantee her
territorial integrity, together with North
Epirus and the islands for the period of the war and a certain period
after
it, while the question of territiorial acquisitions in Asiatic Turkey
was
to be a matter for later discussion. No reply was given to this, and on
May
1 the Greek Minister declared that since the Allies had apparently no
intention to guarantee the territorial integrity of Greece the latter
had
decided to remain neutral.
“‘SECTION III.
“‘On January 20, 1915, M. Venizelos informed the British Ambassador that in
agreement with the King he agreed to cede Kavalla70 to Bulgaria if the
latter would enter the war on the side of the Allies. After the resignation
of M. Venizelos the attitude of the Greek Government changed, and on May 18
the Government protested against the declaration of the Allied Ambassadors
at Sofia to Bulgaria, made on May 16, offering the latter Kavalla. On July
21 the Allied Ambassadors communicated to the Greek Minister that the
Allies’ offer of Kavalla to Bulgaria was connected with the offer to Greece
of large terrirorial acquisitions in Asiatic Turkey. On July 30 the Greek
Government handed to the Allies a Note protesting against ceding Kavalla to
Bulgaria.
“‘SECTION IV.
“‘On September 8, 1915, M. Venizelos told the Serbian Ambassador in Athens
that if Greece entered the war to assist Serbia the latter must cede the
region of Doiran-Gevgelli,71 and not oppose Greek pretensions to the valley
of the Struma. On September 11 the Serbian Government agreed to these
claims.
“‘After the resignation of M. Venizelos and the maintenance of Greek
neutrality the question was raised in October of the occupation of the
Doiran region by Greek troops, but this was not done owing to the desire of
Greece not to interfere in the Serbo-Bulgarian war. On October 11 the Greek
King declared that Greece did not wish to occupy Doiran-Monastir, and still
considered herself the ally of Serbia.
70 A port in Macedonia greatly desired by Bulgaria.
71 A Macedonian district, in Serbian occupation, bordering on the Greek
frontier in the Vardar valley, north of Salonika.
“‘SECTION V.
“‘On October 7, 1915, the British Ambassador in Athens offered Greece the
cession of Cyprus72 if Greece would immediately enter the war. On October
12 the Ambassador informed the Minister that the Cyprus offer was no longer
valid since Greece had not entered.
“‘SECTION VI.
“‘On November 6. 1915, the Allied Ambassadors in Athens informed the Greek
Government that the Allies would return Salonika and the occupied
territories after the war and pay damages.
“‘SECTION VII.
“‘In the beginning of October, 1914, M. Venizelos asked the London Cabinet
not to raise objection to the Greek occupation of North Epirus and the
Italian occupation of Valona to restore order in these regions without
prejudicing a future settlement. The Italian Government agreed, and the
occupation was made. On February 14, 1915, the Allied Ambassadors in Athens
protested against the Greek seizure of territory in Albania. The latter
replied they had no such intention. On March 7, 1916, the Greek Premier
Skouloudis declared in the Chamber that North Epirus was part of Greece,
and the Government had appointed two prefects in these regions.
“‘On March 13 the Allied Ambassadors in Athens protested against the union
of North Epirus to Greece as a breach of the undertaking given in October,
1914. On March 16 the Greek Government answered that it had in view the
establishment of a system of government in Epirus more in keeping with
Liberal Greek sentiment than that hitherto existing.’”
72 Britain formally annexed Cyprus in November, 1914. This reported offer
to Greece evoked a strong protest from the Moslem inhabitants of Cyprus,
who, it is said, sent a memorial to Sir Edward Grey against such a proposal.
Appendix C.
DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS RELATING TO JAPAN.
The following diplomatic documents, from the archives
of the Russian Foreign Office, have appeared in the Petrograd Press.
The translations were published in the Manchester Guardian on February 7 and 22, 1918. The first three
relate to Japan’s territorial war aims, the last three to Japan’s relations
with China and to the interpretation of the term “special interests” in the
Japanese-American Agreement quoted on page 64:—
I.
“From M. Krupensky, the former Russian Ambassador at Tokyo. Dispatch dated
February 8, 1917.
“I never omit an opportunity for representing to the Minister for Foreign
Affairs the desirability, in the interests of Japan herself, of China’s
intervention in the war, and only last week I had a conversation with him
on the subject. To-day I again pointed out to him that the present moment
was particularly favourable, in view of the position taken up by the United
States and the proposal made by them to the neutral Powers to follow their
example, and more particularly, in view of the recent speeches of the
American Minister at Peking. Viscount Motono replied that he would be the
first to welcome a rupture between China and Germany, and would not
hesitate to take steps in this direction at Peking if he were sure that the
Chinese Government would go in that direction. So far, however, he had no
such assurance, and he feared lest unsuccessful representations at Peking
might do harm to the Allies. He promised me to sound the attitude of Peking
without delay, and, in case of some
84
hope of success, to propose to the Cabinet to take a decision in the
desired direction.
“On the other hand, the Minister pointed out the necessity for him, in view
of the attitude of Japanese public opinion on the subject, as well as with
a view to safeguard Japan’s position at the future Peace Conference, if
China should be admitted to it, of securing the support of the Allied
Powers to the desires of Japan in respect of Shantung and the Pacific
Islands. These desires are for the succession to all the rights and
privileges hitherto possessed by Germany in the Shantung province and for
the acquisition of the islands to the north of the equator which are now
occupied by the Japanese. Motono plainly told me that the Japanese
Government would like to receive at once the promise of the Imperial
[Russian] Government to support the above desires of Japan. In order to
give a push to the highly important question of a break between China and
Germany I regard it as very desirable that the Japanese should be given the
promise they ask-this the more as, so far as can be seen here, the
relations between Great Britain and Japan have of late been such as to
justify a surmise that the Japanese aspirations would not meet with any
objections on the part of the London Cabinet.”
II.
Despatch dated March 1, 1917.
“The Minister for Foreign Affairs asked me to-day whether I had received a
reply from the Imperial [Russian] Government relating to Japan’s desires on
the question of Shantung and the Pacific Islands, and told me that the
Japanese Government would very much like to have at the earliest a promise
from us on the subject.”
III.
Despatch dated March 21, 1917.
“I communicated to-day to the Minister for Foreign Affairs the contents of
your High Excellency’s telegram, and gave him a copy. Viscount Motono
confined himself to the observation that he took note of my communication,
and would report it to the Council of Ministers and the Emperor. The
attitude of public opinion and the Press here towards the Revolution in
Russia is, on the whole, sympathetic. It is regarded as a pledge of a
successful prosecution of the war until complete victory has been obtained,
and the end of the
rule of the bureaucracy is welcomed. While paying due tribute to the
Emperor’s and the Grand Duke Michael Alexandrovitch’s patriotic acts of
abdication, public opinion here expresses the hope that the new Government
and the popular representatives to be summoned would not be inclined
towards extreme decisions. The same attitude towards the events in Russia
could be perceived in the few general words which I heard in this
connection from the Minister of Foreign Affairs.”
IV.
Despatch trom the Russian Ambassador at Tokyo, dated October 16,1917.
“In reply to my question as to the credibility of the rumours alleging that
Japan is prepared to sell to the Chinese Government a considerable quantity
of arms and munitions, Viscount Motono confirmed them, and added that the
Peking Government had promised not to use the arms against the Southerners.
It was evident from the Minister’s words, however, that this promise
possessed only the value of a formal justification of this sale, infringing
as the latter does the principle of non-intervention in the internal
Chinese feuds, proclaimed by Japan herself, and that the Japanese
Government was in this instance deliberately assisting the Tuan-tse-shua
Cabinet in the hope of receiving from it in return substantial advantages.
It is most likely that the Japanese are aiming principally at obtaining the
privilege of rearming the entire Chinese army, and at making China
dependent in the future on Japanese arsenals and the supply of munitions
from Japan. The arms to be supplied to China are estimated at 30,000,000
yen. At the same time, Japan intends establishing an arsenal in China for
the manufacture of war material.”
V.
Despatch dated October 22, 1917.
“Referring to Bakhmetyeff’s [Russian Ambassador at Washington] N 598, if
the United States thinks, as it appeared to our Ambassador [from
conversation with Lansing], that the recognition of Japan’s special
position in China is of no practical consequence, such a view will
inevitably lead in the future to serious misunderstandings between us and
Japan. The Japanese are manifesting more and more clearly a tendency to
interpret the special position of
Japan in China, inter alia, in the sense that other Powers must not
undertake in China any political steps without previously exchanging views
with Japan on the subject-a condition that would to some extent establish a
Japanese control over the foreign affairs of China. On the other hand, the
Japanese Government does not attach great importance to its recognition of
the principle of the open door and the integrity of China, regarding it as
merely a repetition of the assurances repeatedly given by it earlier to
other Powers and implying no new restrictions for tha Japanese policy in
China. It is therefore quite possible that at some future time there may
arise in this connection misunderstandings between the United States and
Japan. The Minister of Foreign Affairs again confirmed to-day in
conversation with me that in the negotiations by Viscount Ishii the
question at issue is not some special concession to Japan in these or other
parts of China, but Japan’s special position in China as a whole.”
VI.
Despatch dated November 1,1917.
“The Minister for Foreign AFfairs asked me to call on him to-day, and
communicated to me confidentially, but quite officially, the text of the
Notes transmitted in my telegram N. 2, which are to be exchanged at
Washington on November 2 or 3 between the American State Secretary and
Viscount Ishii. A similar communication was made to-day to the British
Ambassador here. The French and Italian Ambassadors will receive the text
of the Notes in a day or two, privately, for their information. The
publication of the Notes will probably take place on November 7; until then
the Minister asks the Powers to keep his communication secret.
“When handing me the above-mentioned text of the Notes, Viscount Motono
added that he had only received it in final form yesterday by wire from
Washington; and since Viscount Ishii was to leave [Washington] the night
after next, the signature of the Notes could not have been postponed, in
spite of the Japanese Government’s desire to ascertain the views of the
Russian Government on the subject prior to it. The Minister hoped that he
would not be blamed for that at Petrograd-especially as the present
agreement between America and Japan could not arouse any objection on our
part. Viscount Motono mentioned that when concluding [gap in the original],
one of the objects was to put an end to the German
intrigues intended to sow discord between Japan and the United States, and
to prove thereby to the Chinese that there was between the two Powers a
complete agreement of view with regard to China, who, therefore, must not
reckon on the possibility of extracting any profit from playing off one
against the other.
“To my question whether he did not fear that in the future
misunderstandings might arise from the different interpretations by Japan
and the United States of the meaning of the terms: ‘special position’ and
‘special interests’ of Japan in China, Viscount Motono replied by saying
that-[a gap in the original]. Nevertheless, I gain the impression from the
words of the Minister that he is conscious of the possibility of
misunderstandings also in the future, but is of the opinion that in such a
case Japan would have better means at her disposal for carrying into effect
her interpretation than the United States.”
Appendix D.
CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE
1914. |
| Aug. | 4— | Britain declares War on Germany. |
| Sept. | 5— | Allies’ declaration not to conclude Separate Peace. |
| Nov. | 22— | Allies offer South Albania to Greece. |
1915. |
| March | 12— | Constantinople and Persia Agreement. |
| March | 30— | Allies offer Aiden Vilayet (Asia Minor) to Greece. |
| April | 26— | Treaty of London (the Agreement with ltaly). |
| May | 16— | Allies offer Kavala to Bulgaria.
........[Mr. Asquith’s Coalition Government.] |
| May | 19— | Formation of Coalition Government announced. |
| Oct. | 7— | Britain offers Cyprus to Greece. |
1916. |
| Spring | — | Asia Minor Agreement between Britain, France, and
........Russia. |
| March | 9— | Russia insists on exclusion of Polish question from
........international discussion. |
| July | 3— | Secret treaty between Russia and Japan. |
| Aug. | 18— | The Treaty with Roumania.
........[Mr. Lloyd George’s Government.] |
| Dec. | 6— | Mr. Lloyd George undertakes to form Government. |
1917 |
| March | 11— | ”Left Bank of tha Rhine” Agreement between France
........and Russia. |
| March | 12— | The Russian Revolution. |
| March | 15— | Abdication of the Tsar. |
| April | — | Savoy Conference. Alleged new Agreement between
........Britain, France, and Italy. |
|
89
INDEX
INDEX
| BRITAIN | PAGE |
| | To | receive | Neutral Zone in Persia (March, 1915) | 23 |
| | " | " | Southern Mesopotamia (Spring, 1916) | 46 |
| | " | " | Baghdad (Spring, 1916) | 46 |
| | " | " | Haifa and Akka (in Syria) (Spring, 1916) | 46 |
| | and prospective acquisition of German African Colonies | 40 |
FRANCE |
| | To | receive | Syria (Spring, 1916) | 45 |
| | " | " | Adana Vilayet (Spring, 1916) | 45 |
| | " | " | Territory in Asia Minor (Spring, 1916) | 45 |
| | " | " | Alsace-Lorraine (February, 1917) | 72 |
| | " | " | Iron district of Lorraine (February, 1917) | 72 |
| | " | " | Saar Valley (February, 1917) | 72 |
| | " | occupy territories on left bank of Rhine (February, 1917) | 72 |
| | and prospective acquisition of German African Colonies | 40 |
ITALY |
| | To | receive | Trentino (April 26, 1917) | 31 |
| | " | " | Southern Tyrol (April 26, 1917) | 31 |
| | " | " | Trieste (April 26, 1917) | 32 |
| | " | " | County of Gorizia-Gradisca (April 26, 1917) | 32 |
| | " | " | Istria (April 26, 1917) | 32 |
| | " | " | Istrian Islands (April 26, 1917) | 32 |
| | " | " | Dalmatia (April 26, 1917) | 33 |
| | " | " | Dalmatian Islands (April 26, 1917) | 33 |
| | " | " | Valona and surrounding district (April 26, 1917) | 37 |
| | " | " | Islands in the Ćgean (April 26, 1917) | 38 |
| | " | " | Adalla and territory in Asia Minor
(April 26, 1917) | 39 |
| | " | " | share in War indemnity (April 26, 1917) | 40 |
| | prospective extension of Colonies in Africa | 40 |
|
93
| JAPAN | PAGE |
| | And China (July 3, 1916) | 59 |
| | Desire for | Shantung | 85 |
| | " | " | Pacific Islands | 85 |
ROUMANIA |
| | To | receive | Transylvania (August, 1916) | 54 |
| | " | " | The Banat | 54 |
| | " | " | Bukovina | 54 |
RUSSIA |
| | To | receive | Constantinople (March, 1916) | 22 |
| | " | " | Turkey in Europe (March, 1916) | 19 |
| | " | " | Bosphorus and Dardanelles (March, 1916) | 19 |
| | " | " | Sea of Marmora (March, 1916) | 19 |
| | " | " | Imbros and Tenedos (March, 1916) | 19 |
| | " | " | full liberty of action in Northern Persia (March 1916) | 24 |
| | " | " | Ispahan and Yezd (March, 1916) | 45 |
| | " | " | Trebizond (Spring, 1916) | 45 |
| | " | " | Erzerum (Spring, 1916) | 45 |
| | " | " | Van and Bitlis (Spring, 1916) | 45 |
| | " | " | further territory in Asia Minor (Spring, 1916) | 45 |
SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO |
| | To | receive | Southern Dalmatian Coast (April 26, 1915) | 36 |
| | " | " | Spalato, Ragusa, and Cattaro (April 26, 1915) | 36 |
| | " | " | San Giovanni di Medua (in Albania) (April 26, 1915) | 36 |
| | Possible annexation of Northern Albanian district by | 37 |
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