Sir,
The almost simultaneous visits last week of the German Emperor to
the Archduke Franz Ferdinand at Konopischt in Bohemia, and of the
Emperor of Russia to the King of Roumania at Costantza [sic] have
occupied a large space in the Vienna press. The former visit, it is true,
was generally declared to be of no special importance beyond affording
proof, if any were needed, that the Emperor William's political fidelity
to his principal ally and personal friendship towards the Archduke has
undergone no diminution. But, at a moment when the peace of Europe is
again threatened by disturbed conditions in the Balkan peninsula, it is
consoling to the Austrian mind to have its reliance on the stability of
the alliance with Germany in any way confirmed, the more so that the
relations of this country with Italy are being just now so severely
strained by events in Albania. Much is therefore made of the affability
and cordiality displayed by His Majesty during a visit devoted mainly
to the enjoyment of the Archducal rose garden but not excluding, possibly,
conversations on other than horticultural matters. The presence of
Admiral von Tirpitz with the Imperial party has of course not passed
unnoticed, and it has given rise to the reaffirmation in numerous articles
of the unalterable resolve of Austria-Hungary to contribute by the
strengthening of her fleet to the development of the naval power of the
Triple Alliance in the Eastern Mediterranean. The Militarische Rundschau
indeed has made the Imperial visit the pretext for an alarmist article
on the position of Austria-Hungary in Europe. Under the heading of
"Foes all round" the writer states that it is an open secret that anxious
deliberations took place at Konopischt concerning the general European
situation, which has become a very dangerous one for the Powers of Central
Europe, including Italy, since the Balkan wars. This is stated to be the
result of the machinations of the Triple Entente Powers, who have lost
no opportunity of completing the circle of enemies which now threatens
the Triple Alliance Powers from every side. The Rundschau claims
to know that important military measures were adopted at Konopischt in
amplification of those already sketched out during the recent meeting of
the chiefs of the two General Staffs at Carlsbad. The military preparations
in Russia, the thirst for vengeance in France, the inclusion of Roumania
within the sphere of the Entente powers all these matters supplied no doubt
the material for very earnest deliberations. The rumour was perhaps not true
that the King of Sweden met the Emperor incognito at Konopischt, but Sweden
now stands side by side with Germany in resisting the advance of Slavism,
and she has replaced Roumania as an active adherent of the Triple Alliance.
This new combination must now be worked out by the General Staffs of
Germany and Austria. Admiral von Tirpitz cannot have failed, moreover,
to call attention to the projected increase of the Russian Black Sea fleet
by three Dreadnoughts. Thus indeed is the iron ring encircling the central
Powers being clenched on the eastern side. In the centre of the hostile
naval forces stands the English fleet at Malta. France, now supported by
Spain, holds the Western Mediterranean. The arming of Russia denotes
clearly the intention to open the question of the passage of the
Dardanelles, so that Italy as well as Austria-Hungary may be completely
paralysed at sea. Hence the urgent necessity, insisted on, it is said, by
the Emperor William, to strengthen still further the Austro-Hungarian fleet;
and hence no doubt the inclusion of Admiral Tirpitz in the Imperial party.
The result will certainly be to hasten the construction of the four new Austrian Dreadnoughts. They will now be available in three years, instead of the five years contemplated in the new naval scheme. "Foes all round, and no hope except in the sharpness of our own sword" this is the result of all the interviews and fraternisations of European Sovereigns and statesmen.
But if the military organ stands alone in regarding the Konopischt meeting as a symptom of the desperate straits to which the Triple Alliance have been reduced by the result of the Balkan wars, the entire press has joined in a chorus of angry comment on the visit of the Czar to Costantza. It is no longer disputed here that this country has lost in Roumania the position which it formerly held there, but the hope remained that the lost ground might with patience be recovered and that Roumania might see the wisdom of reverting to a close political connection with the Dual Monarchy as affording the safest means of maintaining her national independence. The speech of the Emperor at the Costantza banquet and the courtesies exchanged between the two Sovereigns are treated in the press as dangerous indications that the contrary tendency is to prevail and that Roumania has definitely made up her mind to throw in her lot with Russia in the event of a European conflict. This is a topic on which great nervousness is at present displayed in this country, and the honour conferred at Costantza on Count Czernin, the Austro-Hungarian Minister, only a few days before the Czar's arrival, has not sufficed to dispel the fear that Austria-Hungary can perhaps no longer reckon in future on the military support of Roumania.
The Roumanian Minister at Vienna, M. Mavrocordato, does his best to reassure the Austro-Hungarian Government on this point. He protests that come what may his country will keep herself free from any entangling alliance with a Great Power, and that she will continue to devote all her efforts to the maintenance of a balance in the Balkan peninsula between the forces which rely respectively on the support of Austria-Hungary and Russia. In other words the maintenance of the principles which found expression in the Peace of Bucharest continues to be the principal object of the foreign policy of Roumania as defined by her representative in Vienna.
I have, &c.
MAURICE DE BUNSEN.
Sir,
As was to be expected, the visit of the Emperor of Russia to Constanza has made a deep impression upon the people of this country. All classes are naturally flattered by the honour paid to their Sovereign, and by the warm words in which the Emperor spoke of the part played by Roumania last year; and there is, not unnaturally, a feeling that this country now enjoys a considerably increased political importance in Europe.
Of the coldness, not to say antipathy, now observable towards Austria-Hungary there can be no less doubt than of the very friendly feelings for Russia. As to the immediate significance of the Imperial visit it seems doubtful, from all I can gather, whether anything has taken place betokening a change in Roumania's general policy, and it seems reasonable to suppose that she retains her independent attitude towards the grouping of the Powers, without having made, at any rate for the present, any new engagement. No doubt the desire to maintain the Treaty of Bucharest intact and the peace of the Balkans undisturbed has been recognised to be common to the two Governments, as well as a determination that everything should be done in the interests of their respective trade and shipping to prevent any closing of the Dardanelles.
The joint representations recently made at Constantinople by the Russian Ambassador and the Roumanian Minister have caused some comment in Europe, and in this connection I have the honour to enclose a recent article of the Government journal the Independance roumaine.(l) Another journal publishes an article by M. Diamandy, a deputy and a leading member of the Government party, who is the brother of the Roumanian Minister in St.Petersburgh. The writer maintains that the "opening of the Dardanelles" is the "first and immediate result of the Czar's visit," and congratulates Roumania on being the first Balkan State to take an important international step in concert witha Great Power. He points out that Roumania is at a disadvantage in comparison with her neighbours with regard to trade, having no outlet to the Mediterranean but through the Straits.
With very few exceptions the local press has warmly welcomed the rapprochement with Russia. A few journals not so favourable to Russia and of German or Austrian sympathies as for instance, the Bukarester Tagblatt continue to warn Roumania against being drawn into Russia's orbit, and losing her independence of action. If Roumania, they say, breaks away from Austria and Germany, she will become the tool of Russia, and will pay for it by increased expenditure on armaments and subservience to Russia's Balkan policy. They point also to the fact that the Emperor immediately after his visit to Constanza proceeded to Kishinef, where he spoke of Bessarabia as being attached to Russia for 100 years, and animated by sincere Russian sentiments. Has Roumania, asks one or two writers, forgotten Russia's ingratitude?
The Viitoral publishes an interview which its editor claim to have had with M. Sazonof during his visit. His Excellency is reported to have said that, from conversations with the Roumanian Prime Minister, he has gained the conviction that nothing would in future disturb the friendly relations between Russia and Roumania who were united by common interests and the same policy of peace. Replying to a remark of the interviewer that Bulgarian newspapers had spoken of a revision of the Treaty of Peace and the meeting of a European conference, M. Sazonof is reported to have said there was and could be no question of revision.
I have, &c.
A. AKERS-DOUGLAS.
(1) Not printed.
My dear Nicolson,
I am too tired to do more than to repeat to you what Sazonow told me in strict confidence of what had passed at Constantza. He begged me not to tell Paleologue as he was afraid of leakage at the Quai d'Orsay.
There had, he said, been no question of an alliance or of a Convention of any kind, but the results of the visit had been most satisfactory. The King, with whom he had had two long conversations, had expressed his satisfaction at the fact that the Russian Government had not raised the question of the Straits during the two Balkan wars and had thanked Sazonow for the support which he had given Roumania with regard to the Treaty of Bucharest. The principle of the inviolability of that Treaty was, His Majesty said, of vital moment to Roumania. There were two questions the Black Sea and the status quo in the Balkans which possessed a common interest for Russia and Roumania. The King then enquired what were the views of the Russian Government with regard to the Straits. Were they restricted to securing free passage at all times for their grain-laden vessels or did they comprise the larger and political side of the question that had reference to the passage of war vessels. On Sazonow assuring the King that the Russian Government only desired the former and had no intention of raising the latter, His Majesty shook him warmly by the hand and said that in that case the two Governments could unite their efforts to secure an object which was of such vital interest to both.
With regard to the Balkans, the King said that Roumania owed a debt of gratitude to Russia for not allowing the Treaty of Bucharest to be revised. Sazonow replied that Russia had been supported by France and England on this question. With regard to the future, the King said that he had no fear of Bulgaria attempting to recover the territory which she had ceded to Roumania. The Bulgarians had been making advances to him, but he distrusted them too much to listen to them. When they had recovered from the effects of the war they would turn their eyes towards Macedonia and would endeavour to wrest from Servia certain of the districts which had been assigned to the latter by the Treaty of Bucharest. The King thought that it would be impossible to maintain peace for long unless some satisfaction could be given to Bulgaria in this direction. Though he did not indicate where compensation could be found that would induce Servia to make any cession of territory to Bulgaria, he hinted that it might be possible later on to find some compensation elsewhere that would satisfy Servia.
Ever yours,
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.
Sir,
I saw the German Ambassador to-day, before he went for ten days or so to Germany.
He spoke at some length about my reply in the House of Commons the other day, referring evidently to the reply I had given to a question about an alleged new naval agreement with Russia, though the Ambassador did not mention such an agreement by name. He said that the statement that I had made had given great satisfaction in Berlin, and had had a reassuring effect. There was anxiety in Germany about the warlike intentions of Russia. The Ambassador himself did not share this anxiety, as he did not believe in the hostile intentions of Russia. But there had been an article in the Novoe Tremya lately very hostile in tone to Germany. The Pan-Germanic element was really apprehensive, and, though Herr von Bethmann Hollweg did not share these views any more than Prince Lichnowsky himself, he did feel that there was danger of a new armaments scare growing up in Germany. Herr von Bethmann Hollweg had instructed Prince Lichnowsky to tell me that he hoped, if new developments or emergencies arose in the Balkans, that they would be discussed as frankly between Germany and ourselves as the difficulties that arose during the last Balkan crisis, and that we should be able to keep in as close touch.
I said to Prince Lichnowsky that I felt some difficulty in talking to him about our relations with France and Russia. It was quite easy for me to say, and quite true, that there was no alliance; no agreement committing us to action; and that all the agreements of that character that we had with France and Russia had been published. On the other hand, I did not wish to mislead the Ambassador by making him think that the relations that we had with France and Russia were less cordial and intimate than they really were. Though we were not bound by engagement as allies, we did from time to time talk as intimately as allies. But this intimacy was not used for aggression against Germany. France, as he knew, was now most peacefully disposed.
The Ambassador cordially endorsed this.
Russia, as he himself had said, was not pursuing an aggressive anti-German policy, or thinking of making war on Germany. It was quite true that Russia was much interested, and often anxious, concerning developments in the Balkan peninsula; but anti-German feeling was not the motive of this anxiety. For instance, when the Emperor of Russia had visited Roumania the other day, the Russian Government had not talked to us about the visit as amatter of policy, or tried in any way to bring us into it as a matter of policy. I most cordially reciprocated what Herr von Bethmann Hollweg had said, that as new developments arose we should talk as frankly as before, and discuss them in the same spirit as we had discussed things during the Balkan crisis. Let us go on as we had left off when that crisis was over. I was most anxious not to lose any of the ground that had been gained then for good relations between us.
The British Government belonged to one group of Powers, but did not do so in order to make difficulties greater between the two European groups; on the contrary, we wished to prevent any questions that arose from throwing the groups, as such, into opposition. In the case, for instance, of the German military command in Constantinople; which had caused us some anxiety early this year, we had done all we could to ensure its being discussed between Germany and Russia direct and not made the subject of formal representations in Constantinople by one group, and thereby an occasion for throwing the two groups, as such, into opposition, and making them draw apart.
Prince Lichnowsky cordially agreed. He said that our being in the group we were was a good thing, and he regarded our intimacy with France and Russia without any misgiving, because he was sure that it was used for peace.
I said that he was quite justified in this view. We should never pursue an aggressive policy, and if ever there was a European war, and we took part in it, it could not be on the aggressive side, for public opinion was against that.
Prince Lichnowsky expressed, without qualification, that the view he held of our intentions was the same as the one that I had just explained to him.
In conclusion, he spoke again of the apprehension of his Government lest a new armaments scare should grow up in Germany. He added that he had frankly told Herr von Bethmann Hollweg that there were certain things that would make friendly relations with us impossible.
I presume that he meant by this an addition to the German Naval Law, but I did not press him on the point.
I said that I realised that our being in one group, and on intimate terms with France and Russia, had been used in past years in Germany to work up feeling for expenditure on armaments, and there was always the risk that that might be done again. I sincerely hoped, however, that too much importance need not be attached to articles in the Novoe Vremva, for, just as he had had to read an article of which I had not heard before, an article hostile to Germany, so, as recently as last night, I had had to read an article from the Novoe Vremya containing a violent attack on us in connection with the Anglo-Persian oil concession.
In the course of conversation I also said, in order to emphasise the point that Russia did not pursue a really anti-German policy, that there were three persons through whom we learnt the disposition of the Russian Government: one was Count Benckendorff, who, I was sure, Prince Lichnowsky would recognise was not anti-German; another was M. Sazonof, who was sometimes anxious, owing to attacks made on him in the Russian press, as to whether the Triple Entente was not contrasting unfavourably with the Triple Alliance, and proving to be a less solid force in diplomacy, but who never showed any indication of desiring to use the Triple Entente for aggressive policy against Germany,and who used it solely as an equipoise; the third person was the Emperor of Russia, and, as I was sure Prince Lichnowsky would know, he did not favour an aggressive policy against Germany, or, indeed, against anyone.
I am, &c.
E. GREY.
Published in Grey, vol. I, p. 303.
For Prince Lichnowsky's account of this conversation see D No.5.
Sir,
I observed to Count Benckendorff to-day that immense harm was being done by the persistent reports about a naval agreement between Russia and England. I heard that Germans like Professor Schiemann were receiving information from friends in Paris and St. Petersburg that, in spite of all I had said in the House of Commons, there was a naval agreement, and it was even assumed that it included a bargain about the opening of the Straits. No doubt the information came from unofficial people, who did not know the facts, and assumed them to be other than they were. A question was to be addressed to me in the House of Commons on the subject of the opening of the Straits to ships of war, and I intended to reply that this had not been discussed for the last five years, and that the treaties remained in force, but that from time to time,though not within the last five years, the question of the conditions on which the Straits might be opened to warships had been discussed with us. As Count Benckendorff would remember, we did go into this question with M. Isvolsky when he was in London in 1908. We had not discussed it since then. The persistent reports would do great harm in Germany. They might lead to a new "Novelle" in connection with the German fleet, and they might impair our good relations with Germany, which had improved very much during the last Balkan crisis, and which I wished to maintain. I told Count Benckendorff the gist of my conversation yesterday with Prince Lichnowsky as to our relations with France and Germany.(1) I knew that Prince Lichnowsky held the same view as I did about these relations.
Count Benckendorff entirely endorsed what I had told him that I had said to Prince Lichnowsky, and said that he was very glad that I had said it, as Prince Lichnowsky would make excellent use of it.
I am, &c.
E. GREY.
Count Benckendorff's account of this conversation has been published in Siebert Diplomatische Aktent GÂcke, p. 824.
(1) See No 4.
Sir,
The recent visit of the British squadron to Kiel has passed off successfully. I think it may be said that this result was largely due to the fact that the larger portion of the Press did not seek to invest that visit with any political significance, but regarded it as what it was, namely, a friendly visit to a German port of a portion of a fleet, other portions of which were visiting the ports of other countries.
As was to be expected, however, certain organs of the press, such, for instance, as the Hamburger Neueste Nachrichten and the Tages Zeitung,published articles contrasting the composition of the British squadrons sent respectively to Cronstadt and to Kiel, and dwelling on the elaborate reception accorded to Admiral Beatty's squadron.
As regards these two points, it may be observed that the writers either were ignorant of, or purposely distorted, thefacts. The British battleships at Kiel impressed everyone, and the answer to the other criticism is that St. Petersburg is nearer to Cronstadt than Berlin is to Kiel.
The above-mentioned papers fastened on to the speech made by His Majesty's Ambassador at the dinner given by His Excellency in honour of the British squadron on the 25th ultimo.(l) They read as much as they wished into that speech and, in particular, drew the conclusion from one passage in it that a formal naval agreement between Great Britain and Russia was imminent, notwithstanding your statement to the contrary in the House of Commons. The Tages Zeitung contained 3 bitter articles yesterday on the subject of the visit of the British fleet to Kiel. I am forwarding in a separate despatch a précis by the Naval Attaché of this and other press articles on the subject of this visit.(2) Speaking generally, however, the visit to Kiel seems rather to have been used by the hostile organs of the press in order to draw attention to the hostile plan of France and Russia towards Germany. The utmost good fellowship prevailed between the Officers and men of both nations during the visit of the British squadron to Kiel. In this connection, I venture to report the following: The correspondent of the Daily Mail asked one of the British warrant officers what was the state of the feeling between the sailors of the two nations. The officer, not knowing who his interlocutor was, replied:"There is nothing the matter with the feeling if the press would only leave it alone."
A humorous incident occurred in the course of last week. Lord Brassey was detained for an hour or so for unwittingly trespassing in the proximityof the Naval dockyard. He was immediately released on establishing his identity, but the incident, much to the annoyance of the Emperor, was soon magnified into an attempt at espionage. Instead of allowing the matter to drop, the official explanation was then put forward, that Lord Brassey had been detained on suspicion of attempting to smuggle.
Nothing could exceed the warmth of the welcome extended to the British officers and men. Unfortunately, the close of the visit was marred by the news of the tragic events at Serajevo, which obliged the Emperor to cut short his visit to Kiel, and caused the abandonment of some of the entertainments. Had not the German press been fully occupied in considering the affairs of theAustro-Hungarian Monarchy, further articles of interest would, no doubt, have been published on the occasion of the fleet's departure from Kiel.
I have, &c.
HORACE RUMBOLD.
(1) See Enclosure to No. 8. The reference appears to be to a speech delivered on June 24. No report of a speech delivered on June 25 can be found.
(2) See Enclosure to No. 7.
Sir.
I have the honour to transmit herewith a report which I have received from Captain W. Henderson, Naval Attaché to His Majesty's Embassy, on the visit of His Majesty's ships to Kiel.
I have, &c.
HORACE RUMBOLD.
Enclosure in No. 7.
Captain Henderson to Sir H. Rumbold.
Confidential.
Berlin, July 3, 1914.
Sir,
Visit of British squadron to Kiel.
I have the honour to submit the following report on the visit of our Second Battle Squadron and three light cruisers to Kiel during Kiel Regatta Week:
From the moment it was known at the Reichs-Marine-Amt that a visit was in contemplation, I was approached by many German naval officers in Berlin, who gave honest expression to the satisfaction with which they looked forward to the occurrence.
His Majesty the German Emperor spoke to me with evident pleasure about it, and I do not doubt that the lavish hospitality which was subsequently shown to our squadron was due largely to His Majesty's desire that we should be well entertained, for before the programme was made out His Majesty remarked jokingly to me: "You'll see we shall have something nice on ice for you at Kiel."
The German press was at first reticent about the approaching visit, and very little was said about it beyond the bare publication of the fact that it was going to take place. Later on, however, some of the leading Conservative organs let themselves go.
The rumour that the First Lord of the Admiralty would be present at Kiel during the visit lent colour to the suggestion that the visit would have political significance, and that Mr. Churchill was expected up to the last moment was shown by the fact that on the official chart of the berths in Kiel harbour a buoy was reserved for the Enchantress.
A retired German admiral, von Ahlefeld, writing in the DeutscheRevue before it was definitely known that Mr. Churchill was not coming to Kiel, laid it down as a primary condition of "conversations" that the German nation should not be asked to "measure its fleet according to British wishes." Given this condition, he goes on to say that much good could result from an interchange of views, especially if this were to lead to a conviction on both sides that their respective interests were not menaced the greatest good that could result would be the release of both fleets from monotonous and spirit-crushing routine in home waters.
The Berliner Tageblatt (Liberal) answered this by saying that it hoped Mr. Churchill's visit would result in an understanding on armaments, as this was the only subject worth talking about.
The Dresdner Nachrichten (Conservative) published an unfriendly article, headed "No Illusions," in which it stated that the obvious intention of the simultaneous visit of another of our squadrons to Cronstadt was to take the shine out of the visit to Kiel.
It is said that in spite of Sir Edward Grey's denial of any formal understanding with Russia, his dÀ)Àmenti (?) was not as exact as it might have been and that in Germany it was still accepted as a fact that a verbal understanding had been arrived at as to co-operation of the British and Russian fleets against Germany, Russia to contain part of the German fleet in the Baltic while England annihilated theremainder in the North Sea. It warned its readers not to lose their heads over the prospective festivities at Kiel, and ended up by saying that on the German side the motto should be "Watchfulness and holding-back."
The "Deutsche Zeitung" (Conservative) took similar views and regarded the almost simultaneous visits of British squadrons to the Baltic Powers as a piece of ostentation on England's part, designed with a view to impress the world with our ability to produce sufficient squadrons to do this and also to show the world that we do not consider the Baltic as being outside our sphere of influence. This paper also doubted Sir Edward Grey's sincerity and bona fides concerning the wording of his denial of an Anglo-Russian naval understanding.
The "Kreuz-Zeitung" (Conservative) regarded the simultaneous visits not only as a smoothing down of Russian feeling in case they should be hurt by the Kiel visit, but also as an attempt to drive a wedge into the recent rapprochement between Germany and Sweden, and a demonstration to the world that England does not regard the Baltic as a mare clausum. As long as these points were not lost sight of, the"Kreuz-Zeitung" was prepared to give the British squadron a friendly welcome in Kiel.
As soon as it became known that the First Lord of the Admiralty was not coming to Kiel, the tone of the German press altered, and prominence was given to the statement that, as Mr. Churchill had not accompanied our squadron, the visit would have absolutely no political significance. The papers then published friendly and appreciative articles about our navy, our squadron at Kiel, and its officers and men.
Although careful always to emphasise the non-political character of the visit,
practically all papers admitted that it could not fail to have a good effect on Anglo-
German feeling. Many papers mentioned the blood-relationship between England and
Germany, alluded to the two peoples as the leaders of modern culture, and expressed
the view that they ought to lead the world as friendly rivals instead of as enemies.
The peroration to the German press utterances was contributed by an unusually bitter article by Count Reventlow in the "DeutscheTageszeitung"(Conservative), on the
occasion of the departure of our squadron from Kiel, headed "Kiel Gush."
Referring to Vice-Admiral Sir George Warrender's hearty and non-political speech at the lunch given by Kiel Municipality, Count Reventlow churlishly remarks:
"It can be taken for granted that Sir George Warrender was told what he had to say
before he left England, and the British press echoed accordingly."
Count Reventlow then gets to work on the speech of our Ambassador at St. Petersburg and only says in different words what has been said before.
The rest of his article complains of the exuberance of the festivities to the British squadron at Kiel, which has only resulted in giving the English an altogether wrong impression of the state of feeling in Germany. According to Count Reventlow an
English reader of the newspapers would get the impression that Germany had experienced an exceptional stroke of luck in being honoured by the presence of the British squadron, and would conclude that if this state of feeling could be so cheaply brought about, the experiment ought to be repeated more frequently. He admits many personal sympathies between British and German officers, and that in the past Germany
had learnt much from the British Navy; but beyond that the "feeling" did not go. He
derides the sentimental "standing shoulder to shoulder" phantasy, and the suggestion that
British and German naval officers mutually deplored the "unholy competition in armaments." German officers knew too well the motives which inspire England's policy
and the instrument (the British fleet) with which these motives were supported. "The
memory of the festivities would evaporate, but the unpleasant impression in German
minds of a new unusual, and politically wrong German "gush" would for the present
remain. Later on when the reaction came, German enthusiasts of to-day would look out
over the North Sea, vexed and astounded, only to remember that at Kiel they had
celebrated a feast of self-deception.
So much for the German press. It must be remembered when reading the above
that I have brought into prominence the views of those who distrust us, that is to say,
the Conservative view, but it would be wrong to take these articles to which I have
given prominence as exemplifying the views of the majority of Germans. They are
distinctly the views of the minority, although of an influential minority.
Count Reventlow, who, by the way, was not at Kiel, is quite wrong in accusing
his countrymen of "gush." That was the one thing which we naval officers were agreed
was conspicuous by its absence. The friendly press was friendly and appreciative
without being gushing or sentimental.
The people whom we met (chiefly naval people) were honestly glad to see us.
The attitude towards us of the German naval officers was the very opposite of that
insincere toadyism and sickly sentimentality which we are not infrequently treated to
elsewhere. It was the attitude of strong, healthy men --men imbued with a consciousness
of equality with us, and who felt that they lost nothing in dignity or in the respect which
they had a right to expect from us by honest and straightforward behaviour towards us.
I talked with many of them, and cannot sum up the feeling of theGerman naval
officers better than by quoting a story told me by one of them:
"It was only last year the officers of a British and German warship were dining
together. The only toast given was a mutual one ' the two "white " nations.' "
It is in the subtle meaning of that word " white " (a meaning which is well understood by German naval officers) that the interpretation of their feeling towards us is to be found.
In fine, it may be said that the Kiel visit was a great success, all the more because of its non-political character. It has achieved more in its non-political garb than it could have in any other disguise, and each individual German naval officer is anxiously looking forward to the return visit in the hope that he may take part in it.
They would all welcome a return to the times when our harbours were the first or last
ports of call during their cruises in foreign waters. They are all sick to death of the sight
of Heligoland, round which all their monotonous naval work centres.
I think it would not be out of place here to call your attention to the striking progress made by the German navy in sports and games.
Two football matches were played at Kiel against German naval teams. The Germans won one match, the British the other. The German winning team was just the usual team of the cruiser "Colberg" without any introduction of"crack" players.
Speaking generally, our men were entirely outclassed in all the usual sports running, jumping, &c. and in the tug-of-war the Germans simply walked away with us, in spite of the fact that one of our teams was an "Olympia"team.
The Germans have systematically invaded what we have hitherto regarded as our national preserve, viz., the realm of sport, and, what is more, they have invaded it admirably, for they have succeeded in instilling into their player the difference between
playing for the game's sake and playing for the cup.
Nothing during Kiel week gave our naval hosts of all ranks greater pleasure than
our freely expressed admiration of the progress they have made in all sport.
I have, &c.
My dear Nicolson,
I see that the " Times " refers in a leading article to my speech at the Embassy
dinner, at which the Grand Duke and Grand Duchess Cyril, theMinister of Marine,
Sazonoff, the President of the Duma, the Mayor of Petersburg, and many Russian
Admirals, &c., were present.
I forgot to send you a copy at the time an do so now that the "Times"has drawn
attention to it.
Ever yours,
Enclosure in No. 8.
EXTRACT FROM SPEECH BY SIR GEORGE BUCHANAN AT EMBASSY DINNER ON JUNE 24, 1914.
"It had not been my intention to make a speech to-night, but the warm and
spontaneous welcome accorded to the First Battle Cruiser Squadron forces me to break
silence and to try however inadequately, to give expression to the feelings of
gratitude which fill my heart.
"More than thirty years have elapsed since a British squadron visited Cronstadt
and during the intervening period our relations with Russia have undergone a complete
transformation. The Agreement of 1907 marked the turning point in those relations and
since that date the two countries have gradually been brought into close touch with each
other. Only two years ago I had the honour to return thanks in this very room to the
Representatives of the Russian Government, of the Imperial Duma and of the
Municipality of St. Petersburg for their warm-hearted reception of the British
Delegation which visited St. Petersburg and Moscow in the winter of 1912. That visit
contributed in no small degree to establish more intimate relations between the two
nations, and this visit of Admiral Beatty's will, I am convinced, carry the process a step
further. Mutual friendship, mutual sympathy and common interest constitute the firmest
bond of union between nations. They enable them to regard with equanimity and to
reconcile without tension any passing differences that may arise between them. I have
during the past few days witnessed with feelings of grateful emotion the warm I might
almost say the affectionate manner in which our squadron has been received at Reval,
Cronstadt and St. Petersburg, and I draw from it a happy augury for the future as well
as the conviction that all the conditions of an enduring understanding are now existent.
The two nations are getting to know and understand each other better. They are
learning to appreciate the value of each other's friendship and I am confident that that
friendship has now taken such root that it will be able to weather all the storms that
may beat round it in the future."
According to news received here heir apparent and his consort assassinated this morning
by means of an explosive nature.
Vice-Consul at Serajevo telegraphs Archduke Franz Ferdinand and Duchess Hohenberg assassinated this morning at Serajevo by means of explosives. From another source I hear that bomb was first thrown at their carriage on their way to town hall, several persons being injured, and later young Servian student shot them both with a revolver as they were returning to Konak.
Account given at the end of my immediately preceding telegram (1) seems to be substantially correct. Emperor returns to-morrow from Ischl.
German Ambassador tells me privately that he is sure German Emperor will come to the funeral, but that he has not yet heard this officially. Minister for Foreign Affairs returns to-night from the country.
(1) No. 10
In consequence of terrible news from Serajevo Emperor leaves for Berlin to-morrow morning whence he will go to Vienna for funeral. Prince Henry will join His Majesty there. Emperor has requested that no change should be made in the programme of the squadron which will therefore leave on thirtieth as previously arranged. (1)
(1) See Nos. 6 and 7
WILFRED HENDERSON,
Naval Attaché
(1) See footnote (1) to No. 6.
No. 8.
Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Arthur Nicolson.
St. Petersburg, July 6, 1914.
Private.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN. I. June 28-July 23.
(29074) No. 9.
Consul Jones to Sir Edward Grey.
Serajevo,
June 28, 1914.
D. 12:30 P.M. Tel.
R. 4 P.M.
(29072) No. 10.
Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.
Vienna, June 28, 1914.
D. 4:10 P.M. Tel. (No. 78.)
R. 6 P.M.
(29073) No. 11
Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.
Vienna, June 28, 1914.
D. 6 50 P.M.
Tel. (No. 79)
R. 9 P.M.
(2967) No. 12.
Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.
Kiel, June 28, 1914.
Tel.
R. 9:23 P.M.